

FRAGILE STATES INDEX ANNUAL REPORT 2021



FRAGILE
STATES
INDEX 

powered by
THE FUND FOR PEACE

For over 60 years, The Fund for Peace (FFP) has been a world leader in developing practical tools and approaches for reducing conflict. With a clear focus on the nexus of human security and economic development, FFP contributes to more peaceful and prosperous societies by engineering smarter methodologies and smarter partnerships. FFP empowers policy-makers, practitioners, and populations with context-specific, data-driven applications to diagnose risks and vulnerabilities and to develop solutions through collective dialogue. FFP is an independent tax-exempt non-governmental organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. with offices in Accra, Ghana and Tunis, Tunisia. FFP boasts six decades of programmatic experience in over 40 countries, focused on conflict early warning, peacebuilding, and sustainable development.

Copyright © 2021 The Fund for Peace.
All rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written consent from The Fund for Peace.

Cover images: Martin Sanchez via Unsplash
Contents Page Image: Tanushree Rao via Unsplash

Report designed and edited by Natalie Fiertz.
Assessment directed by Natalie Fiertz.

The Fragile States Index Team:

 Patricia Taft Nasri	 Natalie Fiertz
 Nate Haken	 Emily Sample
 Wendy Wilson	 Daniel Woodburn
 Sarah Cockey	 Anne-Eléonore Deleersnyder
 Adèle Diop	 Danielle Batterman
 Katelin Reger	 Kathleen Smith
 Natosha Hoduski	 Olivia Kramer

The Fund for Peace
1101 14th Street NW, Suite 1020
Washington, D.C. 20005
T: +1 202 223 7940
www.fundforpeace.org
www.fragilestatesindex.org

Thanks to our
partner,
International
Alert



CONTENTS

Fragile States Index 2021



2021 Map	...	...	...	...	4
2021 Total Scores and Rankings	...	...	...	...	6
2021 Scores A-Z by Indicator	...	...	...	...	48

Analysis


Overview: A Health Crisis is More Than a Health Crisis	...	...	...	...	9
A Booming Economy Will Not Save Us	...	...	...	...	13
State Legitimacy in Crisis	...	...	...	...	15
Rising Authoritarianism in El Salvador	...	...	...	...	17
The Shattering of Abiymania	...	...	...	...	19
A Thawing Conflict Brings a Reversal of Fortune in Armenia	...	...	...	...	21
"This is the Last Thing We Could Afford"	...	...	...	...	23
Turning Up the Heat: Climate Change, Fragility, and Conflict	...	...	...	...	25
Searching for Hope in Lebanon's Compounding Crisis	...	...	...	...	27
Tajikistan: "A Tightly Controlled Environment"	...	...	...	...	29
Towards Inclusive Employment for Peace	...	...	...	...	31
Young and Resilient: Timor-Leste in the Time of COVID-19	...	...	...	...	33
Endnotes	...	...	...	...	35

Methodology

Overview of FSI Methodology	...	...	...	...	37
Methodological Note	...	...	...	...	39
Understanding the Fragile States Index	...	...	...	...	40
Indicators	...	...	...	...	41



THE WORLD IN 2021





FRAGILE STATES INDEX

powered by
THE FUND FOR PEACE

VERY SUSTAINABLE

- 16.2 Finland (179) ▼
- 16.6 Norway (178) ▼
- 18.0 Iceland (177) ▼
- 18.4 New Zealand (176) ▼
- 18.8 Denmark (175) ▼
- 19.9 Switzerland (174) ▼

SUSTAINABLE

- 21.1 Luxembourg (173) ▼
- 21.4 Sweden (172) ▼
- 21.7 Canada (171) ▼
- 21.8 Australia (170) ▼
- 22.2 Ireland (169) ▼
- 24.1 Netherlands (168) ▼
- 24.8 Germany (167) ▼
- 26.1 Austria (166) ▼
- 26.6 Singapore (165) ▼
- 26.8 Portugal (164) ▼
- 28.2 Slovenia (163) ▼

VERY STABLE

- 31.0 Belgium (162) ▼
- 32.2 Japan (161) ▲
- 32.5 France (=159) ▼
- 32.5 South Korea (=159) ▼
- 35.9 Uruguay (158) ▼
- 36.2 Malta (157) ▼
- 38.1 Mauritius (156) ▼
- 38.7 Lithuania (155) ▼
- 39.0 Slovak Republic (154) ▼
- 39.3 Czechia (153) ▼
- 39.5 Estonia (152) ▼

MORE STABLE

- 40.3 United Arab Emirates (151) ▼
- 41.5 United Kingdom (150) ▼
- 42.5 Costa Rica (149) ▼
- 43.0 Israel (148)
- 43.1 Poland (147) ▼
- 44.0 Latvia (146) ▼
- 44.1 Chile (=144) ▼
- 44.1 Qatar (=144) ▼
- 44.6 United States (143) ▼
- 44.8 Spain (142) ▼
- 45.2 Italy (141) ▼
- 47.0 Barbados (140) ▼
- 48.7 Panama (139) ▼
- 49.8 Croatia (138) ▼

MORE STABLE

- 50.1 Argentina (137) ▼
- 50.4 Oman (136) ▼
- 51.0 Romania (135) ▼
- 51.1 Hungary (134) ▼
- 51.6 Bulgaria (133) ▼
- 52.3 Mongolia (132) ▼
- 52.4 Bahamas (131) ▼
- 52.9 Trinidad and Tobago (=129) ▼
- 52.9 Kuwait (=129) ▼
- 54.5 Greece (128) ▼
- 54.9 Antigua and Barbuda (127) ▼
- 56.1 Grenada (126) ▼
- 56.3 Brunei Darussalam (=124) ▲
- 56.3 Seychelles (=124) ▼
- 56.9 Malaysia (123) ▲
- 57.0 Botswana (122) ▲
- 57.4 Cyprus (121) ▼
- 58.5 Montenegro (120) ▼
- 59.0 Albania (119) ▼
- 59.5 Cuba (118) ▼

WARNING

- 61.2 Jamaica (=116) ▼
- 61.2 Kazakhstan (=116) ▼
- 61.5 Suriname (115) ▼
- 63.3 Vietnam (114) ▲
- 63.9 Ghana (113) ▲
- 64.2 Cabo Verde (=110) ▲
- 64.2 Samoa (=110) ▼
- 64.2 Belize (=110) ▼
- 64.3 Namibia (109) ▲
- 64.5 North Macedonia (108) ▼
- 64.7 Dominican Republic (107) ▼
- 66.1 Guyana (106) ▼
- 66.4 Paraguay (105) ▼
- 66.7 Bahrain (104) ▼
- 67.0 Moldova (103) ▼
- 67.4 Gabon (=101) ▲
- 67.4 Serbia (=101) ▼
- 67.6 Maldives (=99) ▼
- 67.6 Indonesia (=99) ▲
- 68.0 Belarus (98) ▼
- 68.2 Turkmenistan (97) ▲
- 68.3 Bhutan (96) ▲
- 68.9 China (95) ▲
- 69.2 Tunisia (94) ▼
- 69.7 Saudi Arabia (93) ▼
- 69.8 Armenia (=91) ▼
- 69.8 Ukraine (=91) ▼
- 69.9 Mexico (90) ▼

2021 SCORES

ELEVATED WARNING

70.0 South Africa (89) ▲
70.4 Fiji (88) ▼
70.9 Thailand (87) ▼
71.2 Ecuador (86) ▼
71.4 Peru (85) ▼
71.5 Morocco (=83) ▼
71.5 Sao Tome and Principe (=83) ▼
71.6 El Salvador (82) ▼
71.7 Micronesia (81) ▼
72.0 Uzbekistan (80) ▲
72.6 Georgia (79) ▼
72.8 Benin (78) ▼
72.9 Bosnia and Herzegovina (77) ▼
73.4 Senegal (76) ▲
73.6 Russia (=74) ▼
73.6 Algeria (=74) ▲
74.9 Bolivia (73) ▲
75.1 Tajikistan (=71) ▲
75.1 Azerbaijan (=71) ▼
75.8 Brazil (70) ▼
76.0 Laos (69) ▲
76.4 Kyrgyzstan (68) ▼
76.8 Jordan (67) ▼
77.0 India (66) ▼
77.1 Nicaragua (65) =
77.9 Lesotho (64) ▲
79.3 Colombia (=61) ▼
79.3 Tanzania (=61) ▼
79.3 Solomon Islands (=61) ▲
79.4 Honduras (=59) ▼
79.4 Guatemala (=59) ▼
79.5 Madagascar (58) =
79.7 Turkey (57) ▼

HIGH WARNING

80.5 The Gambia (=55) ▲
80.5 Sri Lanka (=55) ▲
80.6 Cambodia (54) ▼
80.9 Papua New Guinea (=52) ▲
80.9 Timor-Leste (=52) ▲
82.2 Nepal (51) ▲
82.4 Djibouti (=49) ▲
82.4 Philippines (=49) ▼
82.5 Comoros (=47) ▼
82.5 Eswatini (=47) ▲
83.2 Malawi (46) ▲
83.4 Sierra Leone (45) ▲
84.1 Equatorial Guinea (44) ▼
84.5 Iran (43) ▼
84.9 Zambia (42) ▼
85.0 Rwanda (=39) ▲
85.0 Bangladesh (=39) ▲
85.0 Egypt (=39) ▲
85.1 Togo (38) ▲
86.0 Palestine (37)
87.1 Burkina Faso (36) ▼
89.0 Lebanon (=34) ▼
89.0 Angola (=34) ▼
89.1 Mauritania (33) ▼
89.2 Kenya (32) ▲
89.5 Liberia (31) ▲

ALERT

90.0 North Korea (30) ▲
90.5 Pakistan (29) ▲
90.7 Côte d'Ivoire (28) ▼
92.0 Guinea-Bissau (27) ▲
92.4 Congo (Republic) (26) ▼
92.6 Venezuela (25) ▼
92.9 Uganda (24) ▼
93.8 Myanmar (23) ▲
93.9 Mozambique (22) ▼
96.0 Niger (21) ▼
96.2 Iraq (20) ▼
96.6 Mali (19) ▼
97.0 Libya (=17) ▼
97.0 Eritrea (=17) ▼
97.1 Burundi (16) ▲
97.2 Cameroon (15) ▲
97.4 Guinea (14) ▼
97.5 Haiti (13) ▲
98.0 Nigeria (12) ▼
99.0 Ethiopia (11) ▼
99.1 Zimbabwe (10) ▲

HIGH ALERT

102.1 Afghanistan (9) ▲
105.2 Sudan (8) ▼
105.8 Chad (7) ▲
107.0 Central African Republic (6) ▲
108.4 Congo (Democratic Republic) (5) ▲
109.4 South Sudan (4) ▲

VERY HIGH ALERT

110.7 Syria (3) =
110.9 Somalia (2) =
111.7 Yemen (1) ▲

FUND FOR PEACE

SMARTER APPROACHES TO A COMPLEX WORLD

WE DEVELOP TOOLS AND METRICS



Fragile and Conflict
Affected States



Contextual Risk Tools



Data for Peace



Conflict Early Warning and
Response



Preventing Election
Violence

WE EMPOWER STAKEHOLDERS



Responsible Business
Practices



Security Assessments and
Guidance



Convening Mutli-
Stakeholder Initiatives



Preventing Gender-Based
Violence



Combatting Violent
Extremism

WE HELP DIVERSE STAKEHOLDERS



Contextual Risk
Assessments



Security Standard
Compliance



Security Risk Assessments



Training and
Capacity Building



Publicly Available Data

FUND FOR PEACE

WASHINGTON | ACCRA | TUNIS

www.fundforpeace.org



A HEALTH CRISIS IS MORE THAN A HEALTH CRISIS – PREPARE ACCORDINGLY

NATALIE FIERTZ

As 2020 came to a close, the world looked back on a global pandemic, protests, lockdowns, and economic turmoil. Looking forward to the new year did offer some measure of hope; an array of vaccines had been developed and begun to be administered, but the crisis remained (and remains today) far from over. This is the vantage point of the 2021 Fragile States Index (FSI), based on data from an almost unprecedented year and assessing the social, economic, and political effects across 179 countries.

While it is far too soon for a comprehensive analysis of a phenomenon which touched every corner of the globe, and impacts that will reverberate for years, the FSI can help illustrate some key patterns and trends that are already identifiable. The first, and perhaps most obvious, of these is that many of the assumptions and beliefs that were widely held before the pandemic were not borne out and must now be reassessed at a fundamental level. Second, the pandemic was not a shock only to public health systems but instead both impacted, and was itself shaped by, economic, political, and security considerations. Third, while COVID-19 often dominated our collective attention, other long-term pressures did not sit idly by but continued to have their own effects, in ways both expected and unforeseen.

Before the pandemic, certain countries were widely believed to have greater capacity to prevent and manage large risks, often explicitly including public health threats. These beliefs

MOST WORSENEDED COUNTRIES 2021

+6.3 ↗	United States (42.5)	+4.1 ↗	Argentina (73.0)
+5.6 ↗	Armenia (91.7)	+3.9 ↗	Belgium (49.9)
+4.4 ↗	Ethiopia (95.2)	+3.8 ↗	Azerbaijan (75.3)
+4.4 ↗	Spain (75.0)	+3.7 ↗	Croatia (97.9)
+4.3 ↗	Lebanon (85.9)	+3.7 ↗	Peru (75.3)
+4.3 ↗	Romania (96.0)	+3.5 ↗	Czechia (97.9)

MOST IMPROVED COUNTRIES 2021

-1.8 ↘	Timor-Leste (66.2)	-1.3 ↘	Sri Lanka (92.8)
-1.7 ↘	Gambia (90.3)	-1.2 ↘	Senegal (90.2)
-1.6 ↘	Pakistan (95.9)	-1.2 ↘	Bhutan (85.5)
-1.6 ↘	Gabon (104.8)	-1.1 ↘	Uzbekistan (62.1)
-1.4 ↘	South Sudan (57.6)	-1.1 ↘	Rwanda (84.4)
-1.4 ↘	Papua New Guinea (82.7)	-1.1 ↘	Kenya (82.7)

were often founded largely on explicit or implicit models emphasizing economic wealth and technical expertise. Many of these wealthy and developed countries, however, have been among the most severely impacted by the pandemic and have had their fragilities and fault lines clearly exposed. Others, including those too often sidelined or ignored, have

demonstrated a remarkable resilience from which the rest of the world can and should learn.

Just as the pandemic upended preconceptions about a binary dividing line between countries that were fragile and those that were not, so too did it shatter any notion that its consequences and the response effort could be confined within the bounds of public health. Beyond the health sector, the economic effects were among the most immediately apparent as global lockdowns contributed to plunging oil prices, disrupted supply chains, and the world economy crashed into a recession, with GDP contractions in many places substantially steeper than following the 2008 economic crisis. As the year progressed, the ripples of the pandemic's direct and indirect effects spread further outward, reaching into more areas of public and private life. It also served in some cases as the first domino in a chain of events that ignited more longstanding and deep-seated grievances. The responses to the pandemic were also not simply a function of deploying public health resources as efficiently as possible but instead depended on social, economic, political, informational, and ethical factors.

Although the pandemic at times appeared to drive other issues off the front pages and down the priority list, the challenges that preceded it did not simply go away. The beginning of 2020 saw devastating wildfires in Australia which, combined with flooding, storms, and other fires, make clear that climate change cannot be ignored or minimized. The impacts of that crisis and of environmental degradation more broadly are increasingly recognized as being intertwined with fragility, a connection most plainly visible in the Sahel where violence continued to worsen in 2020. In other contexts, domestic and international situations that appeared to be largely frozen in place despite entrenched divisions exploded in dramatic and sometimes literal fashion, perhaps best exemplified by Lebanon and the Caucasus.

These three broad findings demonstrate the way that tools such as the FSI can offer the greatest value. That Yemen,

Somalia, and Syria are faced with serious challenges is likely not new information. The FSI can help, however, surface high-level patterns, long-term trends, and unexpected results that prompt deeper investigation and analysis.

MOST WORSENEED COUNTRIES

The country which saw the largest year-on-year worsening in their total score in the 2021 FSI is the **United States**. Over the past year, the US saw the largest protests in the country's history in response to police violence which were often met by a heavy-handed state reaction along with sustained efforts to delegitimize the election process, which escalated violently in early 2021. Despite the country's abundant material wealth and an advanced health system, political polarization, a lack of social cohesion, Congressional gridlock, and misinformation contributed to a failed response that left over 350,000 dead by the end of the year and a steeper contraction in GDP than any time in the past 60 years.

The second most worsened country is **Armenia**, which suffered a devastating defeat in a brief but bloody conflict against neighboring Azerbaijan that was followed by widespread protests against Prime Minister Pashinyan. Armenia also reported the 19th-highest number of COVID deaths per capita as of the end of 2020. The third most worsened country is **Ethiopia**, where the postponement of general elections generated increased tension between the central government and the Tigray region which spiraled into a civil war in which the central government has been heavily supported by the Eritrean military and which has been characterized by human rights abuses. 2020 also saw a shocking increase in violence in Benishangul-Gumuz, as well as significant increases in the Oromia, SNNP, and Somali regions.

Among the other most worsened countries on a year-on-year basis, many of them unsurprisingly were severely impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, including **Spain, Romania, Argentina, Peru, Croatia, Czechia, and Hungary**.

However, it was **Belgium** that saw far and away the highest per capita rate of reported deaths due to COVID-19, over 30% higher than that of the next highest rate, by the end of the year.¹ Many of these countries also experienced sharp economic contractions along with lockdowns that disrupted the provision of public services. The 2021 list of most worsened countries is rounded out by **Lebanon**, where political dysfunction set the stage for a massive explosion in the port of Beirut and the economy contracting by an astonishing 25 percent, and **Azerbaijan**, which was heavily supported by Turkey in its victorious war with Armenia and which now must re-incorporate territories which have been held under de facto Armenian control since 1994.

Over the past decade, the top 5 most worsened countries remain **Libya**, **Syria**, **Mali**, **Venezuela**, and **Yemen**, all of which have experienced conflict and/or economic collapse during that period. Among the next five, however, only **Mozambique** has seen significant levels of violent conflict. The other four are instead marked more by increased group grievance and polarization. In **Brazil**, corruption convictions against popular former president Lula da Silva were annulled by the Supreme Court in March 2021, opening the way for him to run against divisive President Bolsonaro in 2022. In **Bahrain**, divisions between the Sunni royal family and its supporters on the one side and the Shia-majority population and the political opposition on the other have widened in recent years. Like the **United States**, the **United Kingdom** has seen increasingly entrenched political polarization and a rise in group grievances.

MOST IMPROVED COUNTRIES

The country which experienced the largest improvement in its total score on the 2021 FSI is **Timor-Leste**. One of the youngest countries in the world, Timor-Leste has seen a steady long-term trend of improvement for over a decade and in 2020 the country demonstrated its increased resilience, recording

LONG-TERM MOST WORSENEDED 2011-2021

+28.3 	Libya	+10.7 	Brazil
+24.8 	Syria	+10.3 	Mozambique
+17.3 	Mali	+9.8 	United States
+14.4 	Venezuela	+7.7 	Bahrain
+11.4 	Yemen	+7.4 	United Kingdom

LONG-TERM MOST IMPROVED 2011-2021

-17.1 	Cuba	-14.0 	Timor-Leste
-16.7 	Bhutan	-14.0 	Indonesia
-16.3 	Uzbekistan	-13.8 	Georgia
-15.4 	Kyrgyz Republic	-13.2 	Tajikistan
-14.2 	Moldova	-12.8 	Vietnam

no confirmed deaths from COVID-19 over the entire year. While the country, which is heavily dependent on oil revenues, did see a sharp economic contraction, proactive unified political action together with broad social solidarity have produced impressive results in containing the pandemic. The second most improved country was **The Gambia**, which has also continued a sustained trend of improvement beginning with FSI 2018.

Those countries which have seen the largest improvements over the past ten years continue to be the result of steady improvement over that timeframe that often goes largely unnoticed, led by **Cuba**, **Bhutan**, and **Uzbekistan**. Also among the ten most improved over the decade are **Indonesia** and **Timor-Leste**, tied for sixth most improved, demonstrating the success the two neighbors have had in moving past

¹ Belgium has since been exceeded in fatalities per capita by Hungary, Czechia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Bulgaria, Moldova, and the Slovak Republic as of May 18, 2021.

their history of conflict. Finally, **Vietnam**, which had the tenth largest improvement in its total score in the last ten years, demonstrated impressive resilience during 2020, recording just 35 confirmed deaths due to COVID-19 and achieving economic growth of 2.9%, 8th fastest in the world.

A WORD ABOUT RANKINGS

Seventeen years ago, when the first edition of what was then called the Failed States Index was published in Foreign Policy magazine, much of the emphasis and attention was focused on the rankings, on who was first and who was last. However, over a decade-and-a-half later, now armed with 17 years of trend data, the discourse is fortunately far more nuanced, with a focus on trends and rate-of-change and with attention paid to a country's individual indicator scores instead of only its total composite score.

Nevertheless, the temptation to rank countries — particularly wherever quantitative data is involved — is nearly inescapable. This year, Yemen once more claimed the top position, for the third year in a row, as a result of its continuing civil war and humanitarian catastrophe. Meanwhile, at the other end of the Index, Finland has ranked as the world's least fragile state for more than a decade (when it first overtook its neighbor, Norway). Though there may be some level of interest in who is first and who is worst, ultimately such an observation does not offer particular insight into the specific areas of fragility and resilience within each of the 179 countries that we assess on an annual basis.

* * *

The publication of the 2021 FSI provides an opportunity to take a step back and reflect on the impacts of the COVID-19

pandemic thus far. One thing that has been abundantly clear and is reflected on this year's FSI is that a shock — whether it be a recession, a natural disaster, or a pandemic — are rarely discrete and isolated challenges. An economic shock is not just an economic crisis. A conflict is not just a security crisis. And COVID-19 has not just been a health crisis. Preparing for (or responding to) a pandemic as a health challenge alone is insufficient and only increases the likelihood of failure. Resilience to any shock requires broader, inter-dimensional capacity. The COVID-19 pandemic has had economic, political, and social effects. These have also had ensuing effects in a cascading series that has and will have far reaching consequences, many of which are still impossible to predict, as countries around the world struggle to recover, regain lost ground, and prepare for the next emergency.

The past year has also, however, starkly demonstrated the limits of our collective attention. While COVID-19 dominated headlines and airwaves, other crises erupted, such as conflict in the Caucasus. Yet when our attention wandered away from the pandemic, we found countries and our communities afflicted by a second, a third, a fourth wave.

In addition to helping guide our reflection on the past, the FSI can also help inform how we move forward over the next year, the next decade, and beyond. The 2021 FSI was heavily influenced by which countries were able to contain COVID-19 and which saw it spread almost unchecked. Next year the focus will turn to the capacities and constraints faced by countries as they seek to vaccinate their people and transition to a robust and inclusive recovery. The FSI can also help provide an understanding of the structural vulnerabilities uncovered this past year, informing how best to prepare for and manage the next crisis.



A BOOMING ECONOMY WILL NOT SAVE US: THE US NEEDS TO DEAL WITH ITS POLARIZATION PROBLEM



NATE HAKEN
SARAH COCKEY

If the FSI's 17-year history is any indication, a global shock comes around about once every 15 years or so. When it does, it presents an opportunity for comparative analysis and forces us to rethink our models or at least to revisit them, as we consider what we mean by fragility and resilience. To the extent that a country's aggregate FSI ranking is meaningful, it can be useful to say that the United States is not a "fragile state." However, 2020 has shown us that there are some shocks, that under certain conditions and circumstances, can be equally as dangerous to wealthy countries than to poor ones.

Before the pandemic, the hypothesis would have been that for pandemic preparedness, countries with strong health systems, public services, institutions, and high GDP per capita, would have done better than countries with poor health systems. The Global Health Security Index,¹ for example, scales and scores a range of highly relevant indicators such as immunization rates, the prevalence of zoonotic diseases, infrastructure, quality of and access to healthcare, and international agreements, to find that the United States, in 2019, was the most prepared country in the world to prevent, detect, and respond to a potential

health crisis. However, as of January 1, 2021 the number of COVID-19 fatalities per capita in the United States² was almost exactly the same as the number who died in Liberia during the Ebola crisis of 2014-2016.³ What happened?

Part of the answer, no doubt, has to do with the nature of this particular disease and the susceptibility of older populations to be more infected. But only part. It turns out that a health shock at a certain level of severity is more complex than just a health crisis. It can be exacerbated by, or have cascading and compounding effects across, social, economic, political, and security dimensions, leading to vicious cycles, feedback loops, and broader systemic failure. In cases of deep structural vulnerability, a health shock could ultimately escalate to a breakdown of public order. This was validated quantitatively in a tabletop exercise we did recently through a series of regressions that suggested a significant relationship between COVID-19 prevalence, economic recession, and protests and violence. The key questions then, for policy makers, are 1) to understand which countries were vulnerable and why; and 2) for those countries that were able to avoid the vicious cycle of COVID-19, economic recession, and violent protests, what made them resilient?

Looking beyond the annual global ranking to the broader patterns may suggest a different way of approaching these

questions. The FSI's 17-year history suggests a medium-term tendency toward homeostasis, where after a shock like a natural disaster or a political crisis affecting a handful of indicators in a given country, there will be a tendency to revert to the mean in the subsequent year. And at a higher level, among most countries there is actually a long-term drift toward less fragility overall, corroborating the findings of Steven Pinker on violence,⁴ Hans Rosling's research on indicators such as life expectancy, child mortality, and GDP per capita,⁵ and the reduction in global poverty over the last twenty years.⁶ This, notwithstanding rising humanitarian crises associated with mass displacement, and protracted and recurrent crises in the most fragile of situations.

The United States, however, is among a handful of countries that have gotten incrementally more fragile in the last 17 years, driven almost entirely by a deterioration in the indicators for Group Grievance and Factionalized Elites. For comparison, other countries that worsened by about the same amount (although starting at very different baselines) in those two indicators were Bahrain, the United Kingdom, Libya, and Mali. Countries that worsened overall by about the same amount (again, starting from different baselines) were Greece, Brazil, Bahrain, and the United Kingdom. If the one-year snapshot tells us something about the relative intensity of pressures and how they impact people's lives today, when it comes to diagnosing vulnerability to the destabilizing impact of a potential shock, this long-term trend also seems important.

Conventional wisdom has it that social cohesion is a dependent variable that flows from a strong and growing economy, and under normal circumstances there may be truth to that. But in the event of a shock, when societies must pull together in new and difficult ways, with shared sacrifice, and buy-in to a national strategy, even the richest and most powerful of countries may be as vulnerable as the poorest country in the world.

In the United States, this long-term trend in the worsening of the FSI indicators of Group Grievance and Factionalized Elites


clearly accelerated after the financial crisis of 2009⁷ with the collapse in public confidence in institutions (e.g., financial institutions and national government)⁸ and a subsequent rise in scapegoating of the perceived villains and undeserving by opinion leaders. A hyper-partisan media landscape, reinforced by social media vortexes and rabbit holes turbocharged by opportunists, pranksters, and trolls has laid waste to whatever social capital we once had – even as the economy recovered. Then when faced with a crisis, though flush with financial, human, natural, and physical capital (compared to the rest of the world), the US did not have the social or political capital necessary to respond and found itself bogged down in brinksmanship and gridlock at every level.

In 2020, fully half of the FSI indicators worsened significantly in the United States, with impeachment proceedings, followed by controversy over lockdowns and school closures, followed by the murder of George Floyd and the largest protests in American history, followed by a delegitimization of the electoral process. Anarchists burned cars. Militias targeted government officials. Protestors and counter-protestors faced each other down with ethnic, racial, and religious overtones. And it all played out on Twitter, Facebook, and Parler, with diametrically opposing narratives over which “side” was patriotic or seditious.

As we move into a new year, there is much to be optimistic about. Government institutions did show resilience. The economy may even come roaring back. If past is prologue, things will go back to normal. The overall FSI score in 2022 will come back down to what it was before the pandemic. But the long-term trend in the worsening of Group Grievance and Factionalized elites preceded 2020. Normal isn't good enough. Eventually, perhaps in 15 years, there will be another shock. And if we do not get a handle on our social cohesion, we'll be just as vulnerable the next time, maybe more. It's not enough to have a strong military, a big economy, a robust emergency management system, excellent hospitals, and infrastructure. We need reconciliation.



COVID AND POLITICAL EXTREMISM IN SPAIN AND GERMANY: TWO DIFFERENT PATHS



DANIELLE BATTERMAN

As the Syria refugee crisis escalated in 2015, an incipient movement of right-wing nationalism gained traction across Europe, including Germany. Spain, however, appeared relatively immune, until 2017 and the turmoil surrounding Catalonia's push for autonomy. Then, with the onset of the pandemic, far right groups in both countries sought to capitalize, Vox in Spain, and the Alternative for Germany (AfD). But here their paths diverged.

At the beginning of the year, both countries were governed by fragile coalitions. In Spain, a minority coalition was finally formed between the progressive Spanish Socialist Workers' Party and the Unidas Podemos (UP). In Germany, the durability of the governing CDU/CSU coalition was left uncertain by Angela Merkel's decision to remain chancellor after forfeiting her position as CDU party leader. In both countries the far-right had a significant presence, with Vox and the AfD the third-largest parties in their respective national legislatures. Despite these underlying governance challenges, Germany's response

to the COVID-19 pandemic instilled confidence and undercut the appeal of political extremism. By contrast, in Spain, Vox got their second wind.

While both countries were affected by COVID-19, the total impact was greater on Spain. As discontent surrounding lockdown procedures mounted across the globe, Germany was quickly touted as an exemplar in its ability to curb a major outbreak during the first wave. In contrast, six weeks elapsed following its first confirmed case before Spain began enacting lockdown measures, leading to Europe's highest weekly surge. However, once measures were put into place, Spain was largely stricter in its lockdown procedures than Germany for the remainder of 2020.² Both governments received backlash for their efforts, with protests in Germany emerging early April, and mid-May in Spain.

The pandemic, and the frustrations over the social and economic impacts of the lockdowns provided an opening for right-wing groups to portray those in power as inept and authoritarian. However, existing societal divisions and trends in state legitimacy along with the effectiveness of the state

response played a major role in the degree to which those efforts succeeded.

In Germany, where the FSI State Legitimacy indicators has had a long-term positive trend, the AfD failed to find relevance. From 2019 to 2020, the group dropped by roughly 6% in the polls, and by October had plummeted from first to third position in its stronghold of eastern Germany. Though anti-lockdown protests made headlines, the vast majority of Germans supported Merkel's response; by the end of 2020, over 70% of respondents believed the procedures in place were appropriate.³ Even after the country was hit significantly harder by the second wave, the AfD lost about one third of its vote share in the 2021 Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate elections.

The AfD's decline was also driven in part by a vigorous state response and internal party weakness. Drawing on Germany's strongly anti-fascist norms, the AfD has been politically alienated by center-right parties within parliament. In early 2021, Merkel went further, placing the AfD on the country's extremist watch list, thereby likening the party to other extreme right-wing movements, such as the Querdenken 711 group. Decreasing party legitimacy corresponding with a widening ideological gap among AfD leadership and rising levels of far-right violence⁴ have played a major role in turning away the party's more moderate, Eurosceptic-focused supporters.⁵

In Spain, conversely, Vox was able to capitalize on state weaknesses to make gains throughout 2020, garnering enough support to win a major victory and enter the Catalan parliament for the first time as the fourth-largest party within the legislature. As reflected on the FSI, Spain experienced a sharp decrease in State Legitimacy since 2017, due in no small part to controversies around Catalonia's relationship with the

rest of the country. Already weakened, that legitimacy was further damaged by an unpopular government response to the country's economic turmoil and overwhelmed public service system. Spain experienced one of the sharpest economic contractions in Europe; in March, almost one million jobs had been lost. Weaknesses in Spain's healthcare system were also highlighted, particularly in terms of its effectiveness in deploying resources, isolating cases, and protecting healthcare workers.⁶ Vulnerable communities, such as those of lower-income and/or of immigrant backgrounds, were particularly affected. All of this led to widespread protests, which by the end of the year had become violent.

Vox quickly capitalized on this discontent by directing blame for these conditions on the central government. Many citizens also criticized the government for a lack of transparency, as well as its decision to forgo usage of the 2005 pandemic protocol already in place.⁷ Critics also protested the lack of "explicit and public criteria"⁸ for making decisions about lifting or strengthening lockdown restrictions. Meanwhile, Germany took a localized approach that utilized publicly specified indicators (COVID reproduction number "R" and a 7-day incidence rate per 100,000 inhabitants) to make changes to lockdown procedure.⁹ By being explicit in what drives the decision-making process, Germany was able to delegitimize the AfD's claims of opacity and incompetence in a way the Spanish government could not.

A shock tends to divide an already divided country and empower radical groups. If these findings are generalizable, then to prepare for the next pandemic, even as countries work to build up their health systems, they should work just as hard on inclusive and competent governance. It could make all the difference.



RISING AUTHORITARIANISM IN EL SALVADOR:

WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THE CRISIS



KATHLEEN SMITH

Even as COVID-19 struck, the very popular new El Salvadorian president, Nayib Bukele, was taking a hardline approach to dealing with a raging gang violence problem, and it seemed to be working. In 2018, the intentional homicide rate was the worst in the world at 52 per 100,000 people.¹ By the end of 2020, that number had reduced to 20 according to government figures.² Debates unfurled about the various factors, causes, and contributors to this success. But the President seems unequivocal about the lesson he took from that experience and has applied it to the new crisis of the day: managing a global pandemic.

If COVID-19 threatened health systems around the world, El Salvador's health system was especially at risk. Since the country has around a total of 100 ICU beds throughout the country, the pandemic placed El Salvador in a very vulnerable position.³ Mindful of this, the government adopted measures to implement restrictions before any cases were identified in El Salvador by canceling sporting events, suspending classes, and banning gatherings of more than 20 people. The government also banned travel from several countries in the following days. Then, after the identification of a single positive case in El Salvador, much stricter measures were put in place.

On March 21, 2020, Bukele announced a mandatory 30-day nationwide lockdown to reduce the spread of the coronavirus. Under these conditions, only one person per family was allowed out at a time to purchase medicine or food. Exceptions were allowed for essential workers such as doctors, journalists, public officials, and energy workers. Those who were found to have violated the lockdown were placed in containment centers. These stringent measures received support from all levels of government as well as the PAHO/WHO country office.

Although the lockdown was intended to last for 30 days, ultimately the measures remained in place for almost three months. Less than a month after the lockdown was introduced, 4,236 El Salvadorians were reported to be held in 87 centers. The Ombudsperson's Office in El Salvador has reported that these containment centers lack appropriate access for food, water, and medical treatment. In addition, those with underlying health conditions and older people are not separated from other detainees, putting them at substantial risk. In response to the lockdown and containment measures, the Supreme Court released rulings that cited human rights violations occurring during the government's quarantine enforcement, which President Bukele ignored. Instead, the president encouraged the military and police to be even "tougher" with those who violated quarantine rules. Between

March 21 and April 11, 2020, the Ombudsperson's Office recorded 343 complaints, including 102 regarding excessive use of force or arbitrary detention.⁴

Access to information regarding the pandemic itself was severely restricted. In March 2020, public information requests, including those for quarantine conditions and individual COVID-19 test results, were suspended. Despite El Salvador's Supreme Court order that the government give its citizens their test results so they can receive any necessary treatment, President Bukele refused.⁵ This created significant confusion as doctors would not provide information regarding test results and the number of days a person will be held in quarantine facilities.

While taking a hardline approach to deter those who would violate the restrictions, the government also spent lavishly on social protection for those whose livelihoods were threatened, providing US\$300 to 60% of households, especially those who relied on the informal sector for employment; handed out 2.7

million "food baskets" to households that were lower income; and froze payments for basic utilities, personal loans, and mortgages for three months.

Through this combination of early action, crackdown, and social support, El Salvador resulted in one of the lowest death rates in Central America at 32.9 deaths per 100,000 as of May 4, 2021 exceeded only by Nicaragua which reported 2.83.⁶

El Salvador has achieved important successes in dealing with crises over the last two years, but if the lesson taken is that hardline, anti-democratic action is the way to deal with an emergency, whether that emergency be a crime wave or a pandemic, the effects could be long lasting. Decreased government transparency and delegitimization of the Salvadoran Supreme Court and the judicial system, steamrolling of the legislature, excessive force, and arbitrary detentions, are a dangerous precedent for governance after this particular emergency is behind us.



THE SHATTERING OF ABIYMANIA



NATALIE FIERTZ

In 2020, Ethiopia's latent fragilities exploded in a complex array of conflicts along pre-existing fault lines across the country. The previous year had seen the lowest level of reported fatalities in five years¹ and in October Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, capping the widespread praise – known as “Abiymania” – for his year and a half in power during which he released thousands of political prisoners, lifted media censorship, and negotiated a peace deal with Eritrea, among other reforms. In stark contrast, 2020 witnessed bloody conflict throughout much of the country involving a mix of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF), regional defense forces, local militias, and foreign militaries, most notably from Eritrea.

Of the multiple conflicts engulfing the country in 2020, the conflict in the Tigray Region, where there have been the greatest number of reported fatalities since 1999 at the height of the Eritrea-Ethiopia war, has generated the most international news. Relations between the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), which governed Tigray, and the central government, have been strained since Abiy's ascension displaced the TPLF as the predominant force at the national level. The TPLF refused to be a part of the Prosperity Party which Abiy formed in December 2019 out of the old ruling coalition and held elections in Tigray in September 2020 in defiance of the central government which had ordered them postponed. Accusations and counter-accusations then sent

tensions spiraling, and war broke out in early November. The ENDF, supported by Amhara regional forces and the Eritrean military, quickly defeated open resistance by the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF), with Abiy declaring an end to military operations by the end of the month, but the TPLF vowed to continue the fight. The conflict has been characterized by accusations of human rights violations and the deliberate targeting of unarmed civilians.

Tigray, however, is just one of Ethiopia's current conflicts. The region of Benishangul-Gumuz, site of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), is seeing levels of violence unprecedented in at least the last 23 years,² and has also seen reports of human rights violations and the deliberate targeting of civilians. Much of the violence is between those belonging to ethnic groups classified as “natives” according to the region's 2002 constitution and those, especially the Amhara but also including Oromos, Tigrayans, and others, originally from outside the region, but has also involved the ENDF and reportedly Amhara regional defense forces, the TPLF, and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA). The drivers of the violence are numerous and interlinked including but not limited to perceptions of economic marginalization of those classified as “natives”, political marginalization of those who are not, conflict over land and resources, and fears that Abiy's new Prosperity Party represents the first step in curtailing or eliminating the existing federal structure of the country.

This brief summary barely scratches the surface of the

complexities of the ongoing conflicts in Ethiopia, nor their extent. The Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples (SNNP) Region has also seen the highest number of reported fatalities since 1999 and violence has also increased in the Oromia, Somali, and newly established Sidama Regions. Though the Amhara Region escaped this trend in 2020, the first four months of 2021 have seen a larger number of reported fatalities there than in any calendar year since 2002.

Many of the narratives around Ethiopia's conflict have revolved around competing visions for the country's future political structure. One narrative is frequently called centralism or Pan-Ethiopianism while the other is often referred to as federalism or ethno-nationalism. Those in support of the former vision argue that the existing system turns "ordinary tasks of governance into sites of ethnic competition and conflict"³ and fosters "antagonistic, exclusionary relationships".⁴ In its place, Abiy has coined the term *medemer* to describe his political vision, defining it as "using the best of our past to build a new society and a new civic culture that thrives on tolerance, understanding, and civility."⁵ Most of those opposed to this narrative view the past to which Abiy references as characterized by "violence, forced assimilation and suppression of cultures" by the Amhara.⁶ The vision of those supporting a federal structure, and who subscribe to a more ethno-nationalist narrative, see the current system as "a guarantee against the oppression of marginalized communities"⁷ and also profess a desire to see "genuine horizontal and vertical power sharing between the center and the regions".⁸

Ethiopia's current administrative structure dates back to 1991 when the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front

(EPRDF) – the forerunner of the Prosperity Party – swept into power by ousting the Derg. The EPRDF, a coalition of the TPLF and three other parties, delegated some powers to the governments of the nine newly defined regions. Five of these regions – Amhara, Afar, Oromia, Somali, and Tigray – were dominated by a single ethnic group that makes up around 90 percent or more of the population. The other four – Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Harari, and SNNPR – are very much multi-ethnic areas. The country also enjoyed almost two decades of rapid and broad-based economic growth – Ethiopia grew third-fastest between 2000 and 2018 and its poverty rate fell by 20 percentage points. Yet conflict erupted again in 2016, at first largely confined to mass protests in Oromia. Even as Abiy's ascension appeared to have helped bring a measure of stability, an attempted coup in Amhara in June 2019 that resulted in the deaths of the chief of staff of the ENDF, the president of the Amhara region, and others, was one indication that the dream of national unity was unraveling.

Ethiopia is becoming increasingly characterized by multiple centers of *de facto* power, including but not limited to the OLA, the TPLF, Eritrea, and the Amhara regional government, as a monopoly on violence slips further out of the grasp of the central government. While a few of these may share some overlapping interests, the multiplicity of actors with often divergent goals coupled with the capacity and willingness to back them up with military force will make finding a durable solution much more difficult. The importance of such a solution, however, can hardly be overstated; Ethiopia is the second-most populous country in Africa and prolonged conflict is unlikely to remain confined within its borders.



A THAWING CONFLICT BRINGS A REVERSAL OF FORTUNE IN ARMENIA



PATRICIA TAFT NASRI

In the 2021 Fragile States Index, among the countries that experienced the greatest increases in fragility, issues of group-based identity and historical grievances combined to give rise to instability. This was certainly true in the United States, where years of partisan politics have turned former political adversaries into political enemies, and finding common ground seemed more elusive than ever. This can also be said for the small country of Armenia, where the eruption of simmering identity politics rooted in nearly a quarter century of historical grievances gave rise to a devastating war with neighboring Azerbaijan. However, relying on ghosts of the past to tell the present story gives an incomplete picture. Other factors at play over the year, including increased economic hardship as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic in a region already suffering significant economic disparities, and the role of other countries in the conflict, must also be considered.

While it is not uncommon to hear scholars of this region, and many parts of the former Soviet space, refer to such conflicts as “frozen,” this term is deeply misleading. For those living in Armenia and Azerbaijan, and certainly in the contested region of Nagorno-Karabakh, the past is anything but frozen. The eruption of hostilities in the region in the autumn of 2020,

which killed hundreds, including an estimated 150 civilians, should not have come as a surprise. While much of the world may have assumed the absence of sustained violence equated to some form of stability, however tenuous, this misperception continues to fuel inaction or half-measures when it comes to confronting seemingly intractable conflicts like Nagorno-Karabakh.

In the case of Armenia, years of low intensity conflict in the contested region, combined with growing economic isolation and hardship, seemed to have been momentarily offset by the “Velvet Revolution” of 2017-2018. With the transformation of the country into a parliamentary republic under the helm of former opposition leader turned Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, who led weeks of protests to foment the transition, Armenia’s future looked bright. This was reflected in the country’s improving scores on the FSI in 2018 and 2019. But while it appeared that the country’s political fortunes were improving, long standing structural vulnerabilities were not so easily transformed. These included a sputtering economy, the unresolved territorial dispute over Nagorno Karabakh, and the continued reliance on outside powers, namely Russia, to provide security.

It also must be noted that both Armenia and Azerbaijan, while at times backing away from overt brinksmanship, also

continued to use nationalist and inflammatory rhetoric in regard to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Politicians looking to bolster their political credibility vis-à-vis a hardline stance on the conflict continued to keep past atrocities at the fore of national memory, keeping grievances alive and undermining any nascent attempts at a political compromise or reconciliation. For their part, the powers with the most invested in the region, both political and economically, including Turkey and Russia, have at times used the conflict, and its stalemate, to further their own interests. Now, in the ashes of the latest war, both have made key strategic gains in a region that has long found itself at the crossroads of history's great power games.

Now is not the time to walk away or return to a reliance on an uneasy truce in place of working towards a real political settlement. The latest conflict essentially reversed the position of Armenia and Azerbaijan from the last civil war, when Armenia seized most of the contested territory and left Azerbaijanis, both within and outside of the territory, profoundly aggrieved. Like Azerbaijan then, Armenia now finds

itself in a situation where the influx of refugees, the fate of important cultural and historical sites, and the role of foreign powers in the latest war may all feed national grievances. These outcomes come on the back of a crushing and unexpected military defeat and what many inside Armenia see as Pashinyan's capitulation to Russian interests, and have fueled a series of large protests in the war's aftermath. While a comprehensive solution that addresses these myriad and complex issues will undoubtedly require thinking outside of the box, the absence of such engagement holds the high probability of a return to conflict in the future.

The larger lesson to be learned, perhaps, from the latest war in this small but strategically significant region is that frozen conflicts rarely thaw peacefully. Rather, deep and unresolved grievances create an exceptionally unstable foundation for any nation. When combined with unforeseen shocks such as a global pandemic, economic downturn, or simply a miscalculation of interests, these "old ghosts" prove themselves anything but vanquished.



“THIS IS THE LAST THING WE COULD AFFORD”



DANIEL WOODBURN
NATOSHA HODUSKI

The shock of the August 2020 Beirut port explosion tearing through the city is indelibly marked in the minds of Lebanese citizens. It resulted in 200 fatalities, 6000 injured, over 300,000 people made homeless, and caused an estimated \$15 billion USD in property damages. As shocking as the events of that day were, the port explosion is a story of neglect, not of malice. It serves as an apt metaphor for the political and economic situation in the country: a culmination of years of cumulative neglect and mismanagement finally detonating. Like the storage hangar where some 2750 tons of ammonium nitrate had been all but abandoned since 2014, the country had seen decades of increasing financial mismanagement and corruption, threatening the country's economic and political stability. The government had been previously warned the contents of Hangar 12 were dangerous, with one report indicating, if left unattended, the ammonium nitrate could lead to the destruction of the entire port.¹ Despite the numerous warnings, the situation was left unresolved. Additionally, in another demonstration of the cost of neglect, hundreds of tires and fireworks were stored beside the explosive materials — a stockpile that roughly equated to a makeshift bomb, just waiting to detonate. When it went off, the fallout was catastrophic.

For years, Lebanon has been plagued by a combination of heavily redundant institutions, bureaucratic ineptitude, financial mismanagement, and inertia. Popular discontent bubbling beneath the surface has been a feature of the country since the conclusion of its protracted 1975-1989 civil war. Lebanon is multi-confessional, and each political party is granted veto power, making management of the country difficult and unanimous consensus integral for major decisions or reforms to be enacted. Political parties in Lebanon often organize along sectarian lines with political elites who have been in power for decades.

Scores from Lebanon's 2019 Fragile State Index indicated Lebanon was already on very shaky ground,² with the government was already cutting corners just to stay afloat. Decades of financial mismanagement caught up with a country that had routinely seen unchecked spending consume an ever-larger proportion of the government's budget. What has come to be understood as a state-sponsored "Ponzi Scheme", that redistributed new wealth to pay off old debts, proved to be myopic when injections of new wealth stalled.³ Strikes and protests ignited by a proposed tax on WhatsApp messages (an important communications platform in a country with a large diaspora population and an expensive state-owned telecoms sector), as well as other revenue-generating shake-ups, saw hundreds of thousands of citizens flood the streets in October 2019 to demand governmental reforms. In a nation already facing a 37 percent youth unemployment rate, and with a third

of its citizens living below the poverty line, it appeared that faith in the government had all but evaporated.⁴ The protests eventually resulted in the deposition of Prime Minister Saad Hariri, who was replaced by Hassan Diab in October of 2019. Many in Lebanon appeared to view this change in leadership as a cosmetic one at best, which did little to address the underlying conditions that had given rise to popular discontent. As the protests wore on, the economy slowed to a halt, and in March of 2020, a government that had been struggling for decades to repay the third highest debt-to-GDP burden in the world defaulted on its loans for the first time in the country's history.


When COVID-19 restrictions further handicapped an already faltering economy and the port explosion disrupted the country's largest center of trade, haphazard, slipshod attempts at patching up the major economic disruptions only exacerbated the issue. Unsurprisingly, the institutional neglect that led to the explosion did not dissipate overnight, and compounded the fallout; reconstruction efforts, specifically as regards aid to help Beirut's residents rebuild their homes, proved sporadic, late, and insufficient.⁵ These compounded tensions between the government and Lebanese citizens, whose expectations of the authorities had been eroded over the course of years of government paralysis and the subsequent governance vacuum. Before August, the Lebanese government's handling of COVID-19 had been inconsistent; the explosion and the many injured piled additional pressure onto underfunded, understaffed, and ill-equipped hospitals, four of which were destroyed by the blast.⁶ Meanwhile, the symbolic departure of Diab a week after the explosion (he remained Prime Minister in a care-taker capacity) did little to quell anger.

Soon, economic instability worsened, with inflation hitting 80% and rapid dollarization of the economy resulting in food insecurity, major job losses, renewed strikes and anti-government protests, and a sharp increase in poverty and brain drain as citizens fled the country.⁷ An estimated 500 of 15,000 registered doctors left Lebanon's shores in 2020 alone.⁸

Given its tumultuous past and years of infighting, paralysis, and institutional mismanagement, Lebanon's political establishment has shown remarkable resilience in the face of widespread discontent, not to mention outside pressure in the form of economic sanctions directed at Hezbollah, the country's largest political party. Successive governments have repeatedly paid lip service to wholesale reforms, while allowing corruption to fester beneath the surface and erode Lebanon's economic and political fabric. A much-needed silver lining is that despite Lebanon's troubles, the Lebanese are largely united in their agreement that the current system is not working; during the mass protests ignited in 2019, an estimated fifth of the population marched through the streets.⁹ And yet internationally, Lebanon did not always elicit the level of concern warranted by its gradual decline before the Beirut port explosion; in a turbulent region like the Middle East, constancy holds undue weight, and if there is one thing the Lebanese political establishment has proven itself adept at, it is plodding along despite significant institutional and social vulnerabilities. In a region plagued by political factionalization, Lebanon's continued slide on the 2021 FSI should serve as a warning about ignoring or underplaying major vulnerabilities until a catastrophe like Beirut port explosion, and the loss of hundreds of innocent lives, brings the cost of such neglect into sharp focus.



TURNING UP THE HEAT: CLIMATE CHANGE, FRAGILITY, AND CONFLICT



JESSICA HARTOG—INTERNATIONAL ALERT

The conflict and fragility landscape is getting increasingly complex as the influence of non-state actors, technology and renewed geopolitical competition has accelerated. In 2020 the devastating impacts of Covid-19 added further fuel to the fire, while climate change has not gone away. 2020 was one of the three warmest years on record¹ with floods, bushfires and rapidly melting glaciers and ice caps making the climate change crisis impossible to ignore. It is however the poorest communities in contexts with high levels of fragility that are paying the heaviest price. But why is this the case and how can we start unpacking and addressing the drivers of this?

Fragility is increasingly linked to climate change impacts and unprecedented environmental degradation. It is considered one of the biggest obstacles to reaching the Sustainable

Development Goals. Although the causal link between climate change and conflict is not straightforward and is highly context specific, there are a number of identifiable common pathways.

Firstly, loss of livelihoods due to environmental degradation and extreme weather, and the crippling effect on people's food security can increase social tensions. Secondly, climate change can contribute to increased population mobility whereby the influx of people can place an additional burden on local economies which increases the risk of local resource conflicts. At the same time these contexts with large in-migration lack shared institutions for conflict resolution. Thirdly, the disruption and desperation caused by increased competition over resources and extreme weather events can be exploited by elite, criminal or violent extremist groups for political and economic purposes, particularly where governments are unwilling or unable to effectively respond.

Inequality of access to, and control over, resources such as

land, water or forests, coupled with unsustainable resource exploitation, has been a contributing factor in the occurrence of violence in various countries. In Syria, a five-year drought from 2006-2011 together with prolonged unsustainable use of water to irrigate agricultural land forced up to 1.5 million farming families to move to urban areas which is widely believed to have contributed to the conflict that has devastated the country. In several cities in neighbouring Iraq, people have taken to the streets to voice their anger over the poor access to clean water during the last four years. Instead of listening and seeking a solution to the water crisis, the authorities responded with excessive force and the arbitrary arrests of protesters. The situation in Iraq and Syria illustrates how state fragility hampers government's ability to manage natural resources in a sustainable and equitable way. In fact, we see a vicious cycle emerging whereby poor governance takes attention and resources away from adequately responding to climate challenges which in turn leaves communities more vulnerable, exacerbating existing fragilities, with the potential to translate into violent conflict.

Another region that has been severely affected by climate and fragility risks is the wider Sahel. As early as 2008, the Sahel was dubbed "ground zero" for climate change by the UN Secretary-General's Special Advisor at the time, Jan Egeland. Today's sad reality is one of increasingly scarce natural resources, threatening the livelihoods of the rapidly growing population. Climate change projections indicate the situation is only going to get worse with the increase in temperatures in the Sahel predicted to be 1.5 times higher than the global average.² In Nigeria, environmental stress and economic and political tensions are fuelling conflict over land, water and cattle between herders and farmers in the Middle Belt. That conflict killed six times more people than the Boko Haram insurgency in the first half of 2018.³

Neighbouring Mali is seeing widespread conflict and insecurity in northern and central parts of the country. The underlying causes of the crisis are long-standing and complex but the climate which is increasingly oscillating between droughts and floods means that nomadic herders and farmers are perpetually

competing over shrinking resources, a situation that is being exploited by criminal and violent extremist groups, compounded by elites pursuing their individual political and economic agendas. The situation across the Sahel seems to be moving from bad to worse. The poor governance of its natural resource base has undermined the ability of communities to adapt to climate change impacts resulting in the destruction of millions worth of infrastructure, loss of livelihoods and displacement. For example, the farmer herder conflict in Nigeria's Middle Belt alone is estimated to have displaced at least 300,000 people.

The ability and resources to adapt to and overcome the adverse effects of climate and fragility impacts vary between groups and individuals, by gender, ethnicity, poverty, unequal social and political power and other processes of exclusion and marginalisation. This heightened vulnerability can rarely be attributed to a single cause and is the result of intersecting social processes and political economies. Although understanding how vulnerability differs is important, recognising and identifying the local agency of those communities at the 'front line' of climate change and fragility is also key. While international and national authorities are grappling with the challenge of how to address climate and fragility challenges, we need to ensure communities are being heard and listened to and proposed policies and adaptation approaches are building on their experiences.

There are no easy answers as to how climate and fragility risks can be overcome. Neither is there a quick fix for deficits in resource governance and political inclusion. Nevertheless, the issue requires urgent action. National governments and the international community must accept and embrace the complexity of climate change impacts, fragility, how the two are interlinked and the multidimensional responses required to address them. We can no longer accept this to slide further down the political agenda due to competing priorities and limited resources. It is essential that conflict and peacebuilding become an integrated part of the overall climate crisis response and vice versa, with the necessary resources to stop the situation spiralling further out of control.



SEARCHING FOR HOPE IN LEBANON'S COMPOUNDING CRISES



RUTH SIMPSON—INTERNATIONAL ALERT

Since the nationwide protest movement that swept the country in October 2019, Lebanon – the country and its people - has been experiencing intersecting economic, political and security crises. The volatility of these interwoven dynamics has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 health crisis and the devastating Beirut Seaport Blast of 4 August 2020. In parallel, relations between Lebanese of different backgrounds deteriorated significantly along with relations between the Lebanese and refugees.

These concurrent political, economic, security and health crises have had devastatingly real impacts on people's safety, livelihoods, and dignity, especially for the most vulnerable Lebanese and refugee families, as well as jeopardising the country's stability. This is borne out in FSI's data, with Lebanon being ranked fifth in terms of the biggest decline in fragility across several key political, economic, and social indicators, which have deteriorated since last year and point to a pattern of long-term decline.

The steep economic downturn and the devaluation of the Lebanese lira by over 85% has pushed more than fifty percent of the population below the poverty line.¹ Already vulnerable

refugees are suffering further precarity, with an estimated 90% of Syrian refugee families living in extreme poverty.² In the face of economic despair, young professionals with networks and the means seek employment elsewhere, whilst young people and workers from disadvantaged groups – Lebanese and non-Lebanese - resort to risking their lives in perilous journeys on boats to Cyprus.³ Both trends underscore the hopelessness felt by young people seeking to make a future for themselves and the loss to the country as part of a seemingly unabating brain drain.⁴ This rising economic insecurity has led to an increase in incidents of theft, petty crime and harassment⁵ as negative coping mechanisms to the worsening livelihood conditions.

In the context of growing economic inequalities and the stresses of simply trying to survive day-to-day, social tensions are on the rise. In Lebanon, since the beginning of the Syria crisis, discourse around social stability has widely focused on tensions between Syrian refugees and Lebanese communities, on issues relating to perceived and actual competition over access to services and resources and disparities in access to aid. The COVID-19 crisis has re-ignited tensions over health services that pre-dated the pandemic, such as issues relating to access to treatment or medications. Tensions over access to and quality of water, particularly in the Litany River in the Bekaa, also continue.

However, some of the most concerning trends, relate to rifts between Lebanese. Gender, class and age are all points of division among communities⁶ in Lebanon that are often triggered by unresolved memories from the civil war. The past year has seen the resurgence of political divisions in the context of escalating geopolitical tensions⁷ after such divisions were momentarily overtaken by the socioeconomic demands of the October protests.

Whilst political and sectarian divisions are most often in the spotlight, with the economic crisis, class divisions and socio-economic marginalisation are increasingly coming to the fore. Evidence from International Alert's analysis shows that women and young people coming from lower socioeconomic classes and peripheral areas feel disenfranchised from meaningful participation in social and economic life. Additionally, they hold increasingly negative perceptions about their future prospects,⁸ accompanied by a sense of hopelessness around their ability to affect positive change in their lives. This limits opportunities for cross-community and intergenerational dialogue and reduces the capacity of community groups to build bridges across divides and work towards collective goals.

As with tensions in the streets, online communities are increasingly atomised and reflect growing polarisation. Misinformation and harassment are increasing on social media, further fuelling tensions, with spaces for freedom of expression shrinking.⁹

Despite the negative outlook and continuing economic meltdown, there is widespread recognition that the economic model adopted for decades needs to change.¹⁰

With increased public mobilisation following the October 2019 demonstrations and the emergence of active community-based and grassroots networks, there are openings for positive and peaceful change. At the community level, local CSOs, women's networks and youth groups across the country mobilised to

provide support following the Beirut Blast. They also provided urgent assistance to vulnerable families, developed initiatives to contain community tensions and tackled COVID-19 misinformation. The October movement highlighted reinvigorated engagement amongst community-based networks and provided new opportunities to open discussions around the meaningful role previously marginalised groups can play, especially at the community and grassroots level.

Local solidarity initiatives can play a part in recovery¹¹ if these local networks are supported and sustained beyond the immediate aftermath of these crises. Opportunities for bottom-up participation should be fostered and new spaces created to connect these initiatives up with formal local and national mechanisms. To capitalise on local solidarity, it is critical that these efforts engage an inclusive and diverse range of participants, men and women of different generations, nationalities, locations and class backgrounds, as well a local community leaders and authorities.

Despite the huge technical, resourcing and fiscal challenges¹² facing municipalities, there is an opening for civil society to contribute to improving relationships between municipalities and local communities through developing the capacities of municipalities in good governance that take into account principles of transparency and accountability, and that use methods of community engagement and participatory planning.

Entry points for recovery and positive action may seem small, but in a rapidly changing context it is crucial to seize opportunities to support community-based initiatives and solidarity efforts that (re)build social ties and social trust as they emerge.

Acknowledgments

With inputs from Aseel Naamani, Programmes Manager, International Alert Lebanon. This article drew on analyses by independent research consultants Zeina Abla, Muzna Al Masri and Rana Hassan.



TAJIKISTAN:

“A TIGHTLY CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT”



EMILY SAMPLE

Tajikistan is the smallest and poorest country in the central Asian region and is almost completely enveloped within the Pamir mountain range. In 2020, Tajikistan's indicator rankings held mostly steady across the board. Despite this seeming lack of change, these scores reflect a resilience to the potential downward spiral that was possible this year due to the Presidential election, COVID-19 pandemic, and continued lockdown of freedom of speech.

Annual GDP growth in Tajikistan remained solid through 2019, but dropped precipitously in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.¹ The unemployment rate for individuals aged 15-59 years was 50 percent, with gender disaggregated data showing women's participation in the paid labor market was even lower.² Due to the scarcity of employment opportunities more than one million Tajik citizens work abroad annually, mostly in Russia. The remittances they send to their families makes up the largest part of Tajikistan's GDP.³ As such, Tajikistan is particularly vulnerable to monetary shocks and COVID-19 has taken its toll. Economic growth slowed to 4.2 percent during the first nine months of 2020, compared to 7.2 percent during the same period in 2019. Despite this, the economy is anticipated to bounce back in 2021-22, assuming vaccination is

available to migrants so they may restore remittances and international trade.⁴

Presidential elections, held every seven years, took place on October 11, 2020. While the constitution limits the President to two consecutive terms, President Rahmon can run an unlimited number of times as the first "Leader of the Nation." This year Rahmon received 92.1% of the votes,⁵ reflecting what the OSCE called "a tightly controlled environment" where "genuine opposition had been removed."⁶ In the EIU's Democracy Index, Tajikistan is placed 159th and is listed as an "authoritarian regime."⁷

In May, there were two rare mass protests; both were suppressed by force. One protest was carried out by Chinese nationals working in Tajikistan who had not been allowed to return to China since January due to COVID-19 travel restriction. Another protest was held by hundreds of residents in the Khatlon region, demanding that authorities provide disaster relief after mudslides in the area had destroyed homes and fields.⁸ There were multiple small clashes at a disputed portion of the border between the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan. The Tajik government acknowledges that its citizens participated in looting and arson, but Khurshed Mukhammadzoda, the head of the Tajikistan Interior Ministry's special forces department, denied that any government forces were

involved.⁹ Further, Tajikistan contended that the skirmish was due to Kyrgyzstan's intensions on the local Golovnoi water intake facility, which distributes the valuable irrigation water in the area.

Building on the banning of 17 Islamist groups in 2016, including both violent extremist groups and political Islamist groups advocating for social and political change, in January 2020, the government enacted the Law on Countering Extremism allowing authorities further ability to curb free expression. Since then, at least 113 people have been arrested, allegedly for participation with the Muslim Brotherhood movement, including university staff, students, entrepreneurs and public sector employees. The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention released an opinion that the imprisonment of 11 senior Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) members was in violation of the country's international human rights obligations and they should be released immediately.¹⁰

In addition to the imprisonment of an independent journalist in April for "inciting religious hatred", Tajikistan's Supreme Court ruled that the independent news outlet Akhbor.com was guilty of "serving terrorist and extremist organizations" and allowed the government to block the website in February. The news outlet has been critical of the government in Tajikistan in the past. According to the Institute for War & Peace Reporting, local and foreign journalists are often obstructed from reporting on controversial events, and independent press outlets and web content remain substantially restricted. Despite the low internet penetration rate—only about 20 percent have access—the government blocks local and foreign news sites as well as anonymizing software and VPNs.¹¹

In June 2020, lawmakers voted to criminalize the spread of "inaccurate" and "untruthful" information about the COVID-19 pandemic through media or the internet, carrying fines for individuals of up to 580 somoni (USD \$56), while media outlets

could face fines of up to 11,600 somoni (USD \$1,130).¹² In July, the head of the Committee on Women and Family Affairs, Hilolby Kurbonzoda, stated that there was a significant increase of domestic violence complaints in the first three months of the pandemic and established a resource center with a 24-hour hotline.¹³ On May 11, Asia-Plus journalist Abdullo Ghurbati, who had reported on the Covid-19 pandemic, was attacked near his home in Dushanbe, and again on May 29 while on assignment in the southern village Uyali. The two assailants of the first attack were not identified. Three men involved in the second attack were sentenced to a fine on charges of petty hooliganism.¹⁴

The impact of COVID-19 in Tajikistan is difficult to estimate due to the unreliability of the numbers reported by the current government. Despite very lenient restrictive measures and little personal protective equipment, on January 26, 2021, President Rahmon declared that there were zero active cases of COVID-19 in Tajikistan.¹⁵ Sources say the situation on the ground is much worse than the official reports from the Ministry of Health and Social Protection.¹⁶ The reported numbers of Tajiks infected with or killed by the COVID-19 virus are discordant with the ways the virus has behaved in other countries. In addition, according to an annual digest produced by the State Statistics Agency, 41,743 people died in Tajikistan in 2020, which is 8,649 more than in 2019 and a 26 percent increase over the average number of deaths recorded annually between 2015 and 2019.¹⁷ Many of these deaths were said to have been caused by pneumonia or other lung and cardiovascular diseases.

Despite a difficult year for Tajikistan both financially and politically, their overall rating improved from 66th last year to 71st this year, a significant change since their ranking as 39th just ten years ago. This points to a positive long-term trend in economic, political, and human security that hopefully Tajikistan can continue.



TOWARDS INCLUSIVE EMPLOYMENT FOR PEACE

ELIZABETH KARIUKI— INTERNATIONAL ALERT

Unemployment, underemployment, and informal work remain significant challenges for the Horn of Africa.¹ These problems have, in some situations, interacted with factors causing fragility in the region, namely, the refugee crisis, competition over cross-border resources, terrorism, piracy, climate shocks, lawlessness, communal conflicts affecting ethnic communities split across borders, porous borders, illegal cross-border trade, among other factors, thereby worsening existing conflicts and threatening regional stability.

The Horn of Africa has suffered consecutive shocks in recent times increasing its vulnerability. These include flooding, poor rainfall, invasion of desert locusts, the COVID-19 pandemic among other factors, all of which have severely impacted jobs and livelihoods. Reactive and proactive approaches to curbing the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, have greatly impacted the way people interact, work, and make a living. Central to these approaches have been strategies intended to limit community spread through isolation and limiting movement and travel. The restrictions imposed by governments in the Horn of Africa in this regard have greatly impeded cross-border trade within the region thus negatively affecting the livelihoods of numerous people. In a bid to limit human contact, these restrictions have also drastically affected certain sectors including transport, hospitality, tourism, and entertainment. The impacts on small and medium enterprises in the Horn of Africa have also been severe when it comes to

lockdowns as most SMEs are labour intensive. Thin liquidity reserves, limited access to credit and lack of disposable assets have also made it difficult for many of these businesses to survive the disruption and devastation occasioned by the pandemic. As a result, a lot of jobs have been lost.

Worsening diplomatic relations between Kenya and Somalia over a maritime border dispute coupled with the plans from the government of Kenya to close Dadaab refugee camp (which hosts a huge Somali community) and Kakuma refugee camp, are likely to heighten tension among affected communities. They are also likely to threaten the livelihoods of the fishing community in Kenya that depends on fishing in the disputed area. Further, the proposed action by the government of Kenya to repatriate refugees from both camps is likely to impact the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers and refugees from different neighbouring countries facing similar and worse levels of fragility. These include Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Sudan, Burundi and Uganda. Additionally, the Tigray conflict threatens to escalate into a fully-fledged war and destabilise the already fragile Horn of Africa region.

Within the development and humanitarian communities there is a widely held assumption that has been influential in shaping the design of development programmes in the Horn of Africa. The assumption holds that jobs, livelihoods opportunities and other economic development interventions have the capacity to reduce conflict and violence by disincentivising the engagement of the unemployed and underemployed in crime

and violence therefore fostering peace. Further, economic development interventions are seen as pivotal in facilitating social cohesion.

In the last four years, International Alert has been conducting research in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia geared towards interrogating this presumed nexus between jobs and peace and analysing the extent to which economic development interventions by state and non-state actors in these countries have contributed to peace. This work culminated into the development of research reports and practice notes² that highlight best practices and factors to keep in mind when designing development programmes for fragile and conflict affected settings that embed conflict and gender sensitivity and yield peace outcomes and inclusive economic development. It has emerged from this work as well as analysis by other development practitioners and scholars that the creation of jobs and livelihood opportunities does not necessarily lead to peace. This is because the factors that trigger, perpetuate, and escalate conflict are complex, and peace cannot therefore be merely achieved through job creation.

Inclusive economic development is pivotal for sustainable peace as it addresses inequity, exclusion, and sustainability. In addition to inclusive economic development, sustainable peace depends on other factors, namely, good governance and fair access to

power; fair access to opportunities to earn income and accumulate assets; fair access to justice; safety; and wellbeing are interlinked. Thus, job creation/livelihoods interventions need not focus on the number of jobs created or livelihood opportunities provided as a measure of success, but rather focus ought to be on the extent of inclusivity, equity and sustainability which can be measured by the distribution of employment and livelihoods opportunities, the targeting of these opportunities, and the resulting impact on poverty and conflict reduction.

As governments in the Horn of Africa and development partners roll out programmes to support the economic recovery of this region post-pandemic, it will be important for them to bear in mind that conflict and peace dynamics are frequently shaped by economic development. While protecting livelihoods and businesses and promoting economic recovery will be of paramount importance, interventions need to be inclusive and be informed by robust conflict and gender analysis. They also need to be based on a thorough awareness of the complexity of drivers of conflict and how they impact emerging conflict and peace dynamics. It is critical that this approach be a core part of the toolkit regional and international partners apply in facing the heightened risks of instability in the region over the next 12 months.



YOUNG AND RESILIENT: TIMOR-LESTE IN THE TIME OF COVID-19



NATALIE FIERTZ

When the Global Health Security Index was released in late October 2019, barely more than a month before COVID-19 infected its first person, Timor-Leste was ranked 166th out of 195 countries. Poor – the country has a GDP per capita of just over \$1500, the lowest in East Asia – and with an under-resourced health system, it was nobody’s image of a country well-equipped to fight a global pandemic. National Timorese politics did not offer reassurance. On February 24, 2020, as the country was entering its third year of political uncertainty, Prime Minister Taur Matan Ruak submitted his resignation after the largest party in his own coalition voted down the 2020 proposed budget. Despite this shaky foundation, the country defied expectations with only 44 confirmed cases and zero deaths by the end of the year. An examination of the Timorese case may provide some insights into how a young nation in the midst of political turmoil defied expectations and outperformed much older, larger, and wealthier nations in its pandemic response.

In late March, despite the ongoing fierce political competition, and less than a week after the country’s first confirmed COVID-19 case, all political parties asked President Francisco ‘Lu-Olo’ Guterres to declare a month-long State of Emergency.

That declaration allowed the government to implement a number of public health measures, including closing the border with Indonesia, suspending public gatherings, mandating quarantine for Timorese returnees, and establishing the Centru Integradu ba Jestaun Krize to coordinate all public health measures. Those living near the border with Indonesia, which by the end of the year had the 17th highest number of confirmed COVID-19 deaths in the world, voluntarily kept an eye on the border and made their homes available for the government to use as quarantine locations.

The political unanimity broke down when the State of Emergency came up for renewal in April as Xanana Gusmão’s CNRT party, which had also been the ones to vote down the 2020 budget, refused to give its consent. This touched off a political realignment, in which Tuar Matan Ruak withdrew his resignation as prime minister – which had still not been approved by Lu-Olo – and formed an alliance with the President’s Fretilin party. That alliance, which gave Prime Minister Tuar Matan Ruak a mandate to govern until 2023 and pushed Gusmão into opposition for the first time in the country’s 19 years of independence, appears to have restored a measure of stability to Timorese politics. The State of Emergency has been extended repeatedly into 2021, but the measures implemented as part of it have been periodically reviewed to adjust to a changing environment and respond to

the twin historic shocks – both health and economic – that the country has faced.

That economic shock was considerable, especially given that the oil and gas sector accounted for over 90% of Timor-Leste's revenues in 2016 and 2017. Faced with a global recession, cratering oil prices, and an evaporation of tourism, the country's GDP fell by 6.8% in 2020, the third contraction in four years. In the first half of the year, air passengers fell by 62% and exports fell by 46% while the lack of a budget constrained public spending.

Despite this challenge, the country was able to use the time afforded it by its strict early measures to implement measures to cushion the economic shock and strengthen its health sector. A stimulus package worth 10% of GDP was passed, the major part of which was a subsidy to households making below \$500/month to prevent the most vulnerable from falling deeper into poverty. Timorese throughout the country also spontaneously distributed food to the neediest among them. Media outlets broadcast messages on prevention measures and brought in public health practitioners to inform the public while shops rolled out basic public health measures. Perhaps most importantly, the government addressed the country's lack of testing capacity; in the early months of the pandemic, samples were sent to Australia for testing. By June, it was able to run tests independently.

Timor-Leste's efforts to strengthen its public health system were assisted by a diverse collection of international partners, from Australia to China to Cuba. This ecumenical approach to foreign partnerships builds on the country's leadership in "niche diplomacy". Timor-Leste played a leading role in the formation of the g7+, originally a 7-member group of post-conflict countries, in 2010. The group developed the landmark New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, which has been endorsed by the African and Asian Development Banks, the European Union, the OECD, the UN Development Group, and the World Bank. Timor-Leste has also played a leading role in

promoting women's rights, defeating Iran in 2010 to win a seat on the inaugural board of UN Women and embracing a leadership role in the region. The country has also considered a leader on LGBT rights in Southeast Asia.

Despite these successes, Timor-Leste faces significant challenges in its future. Perhaps most crucially, the country must find a way to transition away from its dependence on shrinking oil reserves. There have been encouraging signs from Taur Makan Ruak's new coalition government, however, which has moved away from previous governments' plans to pursue the development of a massive onshore oil processing project that had been criticized as an economic boondoggle. In politics, while the recent years of shifting coalitions might read as chaos to some, it also reflects a shift away from a system that was until recently dominated by the Fretilin and CNRT parties, led by independence heroes José Ramos-Horta and Xanana Gusmão, respectively. The emergence of Taur Makan Ruak's PLP party and the KHUNTO party, the latter of which played kingmaker in early 2020, could signal a healthy transition away from the country's old guard to a new generation in one of the most democratic countries in the region. It has also made significant strides in cleaning up corruption, rising eight points on the Corruption Perceptions Index since 2015.

The Fragile States Index 2021 was launched on the 19th anniversary of the Timor-Leste's recognition as an independent country on May 20. This year the country can celebrate its globally lauded response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which combined swift action from the top with solidarity from the bottom. There are still considerable challenges in the years ahead, especially in recovering from the economic shock of 2020 and transitioning away from oil dependence, but Southeast Asia's most democratic country has shown that it has the capacity to take them on. Timor-Leste's record is a reminder that poverty does not equal fragility and that the world's youngest and smallest nations can nonetheless be among its most resilient.



ENDNOTES

A Booming Economy Will Not Save Us: America needs to deal with its polarization problem

1. <https://www.ghsindex.org/>
2. <https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html>
3. <https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/2014-2016-outbreak/index.html>
4. Pinker, Steven, *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined*, Viking Books 2011
5. Rosling, Hans, *Factfulness: 10 Reasons We're Wrong About the World and Why Things are Better than You Think*, Flatiron Books 2018.
6. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY>
7. <https://fundforpeace.org/2020/05/10/democracies-under-pressure/>
8. <https://freakonomics.com/2011/03/09/mistrust-and-the-great-recession/>

State Legitimacy In Crisis: Effects On Political Extremism In Spain And Germany

1. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/spain/2019-02-11/far-right-populism-gaining-ground-spain>
2. <https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/covid-stringency-index?tab=chart&stackMode=absolute%2%AEion&country=ESP~DEU>
3. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/12/09/germany-coronavirus-protests-radicalization-surveillance/>
4. <https://www.dw.com/en/germany-right-wing-extremists/a-54105110>
5. <https://www.dw.com/en/afd-germany-far-right/a-55164539>
6. <https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S0140-6736%2820%2932007-9>
7. https://english.elpais.com/spanish_news/2020-11-27/american-style-libertarianism-comes-to-spain.html
8. <https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S0140-6736%2820%2932007-9>
9. <https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S0140-6736%2820%2932007-9>

Rising Authoritarianism In El Salvador: What Happens After The Crisis

1. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5?most_recent_value_desc=true&locations=SV
2. <https://www.laprensagrafica.com/elsalvador/El-Salvador-cierra-el-2020-con-1322-homicidios-20210102-0017.html>
3. Maxmen, Amy (2020, April 9). "How poorer countries are scrambling to prevent a coronavirus disaster". *Nature*. 580: 173-174. Retrieved from <https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00983-9>
4. Human Rights Watch (2020, April 15). "El Salvador: Police Abuses in Covid-19 Response". Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/15/el-salvador-police-abuses-covid-19-response>
5. Human Rights Watch (2020, June 9). "El Salvador: Broad Powers Limit Accountability". Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/09/el-salvador-broad-powers-limit-accountability>
6. <https://91-divoc.com/pages/covid-visualization/>

The Shattering of Abiymania

1. According to the Armed Conflict Location Event Database (ACLED) <https://acleddata.com/>
2. I.e., as far back as ACLED data goes (1997)
3. <https://africanarguments.org/2019/12/ethiopia-beyond-ethnic-federalism/>
4. <https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2020/12/30/reforming-ethiopian-ethnofederalism/>
5. <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2019/abi/109716-lecture-english/>
6. <https://www.theelephant.info/features/2020/11/27/pan-ethiopianists-vs-ethno-nationalists-the-narrative-elite-war-in-ethiopia/>
7. <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/12/7/abiys-efforts-to-unify-ethiopia-could-lead-to-its-disintegration>
8. <https://wardheernews.com/post-tpf-politics-centralism-vs-multinational-federalism/>
9. <https://qz.com/africa/1785100/will-ethiopia-stay-one-of-fastest-growing-economies-in-the-world/>

"This Is The Last Thing We Could Afford"

1. <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/09/09/world/middleeast/beirut-explosion.html>
2. <https://fragilestatesindex.org/2020/05/10/from-one-crisis-to-the-next-in-lebanon/>
3. <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-lebanon-crisis-financial-explainer-idUKKBN268223>
4. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/11/06/world-bank-lebanon-is-in-the-midst-of-economic-financial-and-social-hardship-situation-could-get-worse>
5. <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2020/12/9/beirut-explosion-insufficient-aid-rebuild>
6. <https://www.ft.com/content/7c6f7c87-8db4-407c-9ef1-1e55b404c023>
7. <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2021/3/24/aid-millions-wasted-in-lebanese-currency-collapse>
8. https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2020/12/22/Lebanons-brain-drain-Doctors-nurses-engineers-leaving-amid-crisis/9091608581590/
9. <https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/10/24/a-surge-of-public-anger-sends-lebanons-politicians-reeling>

Turning Up The Heat: Climate Change, Conflict, and Fragility

1. Climate change indicators and impacts worsened in 2020, World Meteorological Organization, 19 April 2021, <https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/climate-change-indicators-and-impacts-worsened-2020>
2. Building climate resilience and peace, go hand in hand for Africa's Sahel – UN forum, UN, 13 November 2018, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/11/1025671>
3. Stopping Nigeria's Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence, International Crisis Group, 26 July 2018, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/262-stopping-nigerias-spiralling-farmer-herder-violence>



ENDNOTES

Searching for Hope In Lebanon's Compounding Crises

1. <https://www.unescwa.org/news/Lebanon-poverty-2020>
2. <https://www.unhcr.org/lb/14025-nine-out-of-ten-syrian-refugee-families-in-lebanon-are-now-living-in-extreme-poverty-un-study-says.html>
3. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-crisis-migrants-cyprus-idUSKBN2691NP>
4. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-crisis-brain-drain-idUSKCN24M1FW>
5. <https://www.france24.com/en/20200715-hunger-crimes-on-the-rise-in-crisis-hit-lebanon>
6. <https://www.international-alert.org/publications/envisioning-and-contesting-new-lebanon-october-protests>
7. <https://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/Lebanon-Context-Analysis-Feb-Jul-EN-2021.pdf>
8. <https://www.international-alert.org/news/lebanon-one-year-on-october-protests>
9. <https://rsf.org/en/lebanon>
10. <https://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/Lebanon-Context-Analysis-Feb-Jul-EN-2021.pdf>
11. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/in-the-absence-of-the-state-people-are-leading-beiruts-recovery/>
12. <https://carnegie-mec.org/2020/09/16/marginalization-cost-regional-disparities-fueling-lebanon-s-fragility-pub-82714>

Tajikistan: "A Tightly Controlled Environment"

1. Helen Shahriari et al., "Improving Women's Access to Land and Financial Resources in Tajikistan," *Women in Development and Gender Study* (Washington, DC: World Bank, January 2009), <https://doi.org/10.1596/25981>.
2. Ibid.
3. "Tajikistan," *CIA World Factbook*, March 8, 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/tajikistan/>.
4. "Tajikistan: Country Economic Update Fall 2020" (World Bank, December 23, 2020), <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tajikistan/publication/economic-update-fall-2020>.
5. "Tajikistan."
6. "World Report 2021: Rights Trends in Tajikistan," *Human Rights Watch* (blog), December 4,

2020, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/tajikistan>.

7. The Economist Intelligence Unit, "Democracy Index 2020: In Sickness and in Health?" (New York, NY: The Economist, 2021), https://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/democracy-index-2020.pdf?mkt_tok=NzUzLVJJUS00MzgAAAF7_tjmZuzlRdGQ9PEYG-Q55arD7UpSjzuU97mlMsl3-SDhzbHclQlo20QCXSX0x3j1rBA1qSKLD5guFmhrHwQ5ezrgw-V0LgmVZa7hjsb8F6Q4w.
8. "Tajikistan Sees Unusual Protests, Authorities React with Force," *Eurasianet*, May 21, 2020, <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-sees-unusual-protests-authorities-react-with-force>.
9. Ayzirek Imanaliyeva and Kamila Ibragimova, "Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan: Communities Take Stock of Destruction Wrought by Border Unrest," *Eurasianet*, May 3, 2020, <https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-tajikistan-communities-take-stock-of-destruction-wrought-by-border-unrest>.
10. "World Report 2021: Rights Trends in Tajikistan."
11. Sertan Sanderson, "Press Freedom in Tajikistan: Going from Bad to Worse," *Global Media Forum* (blog), May 6, 2020, <https://p.dw.com/p/3dJFC>.
12. "Tajikistan: COVID-19 Outbreak Offers Cover for Fresh Assault on Free Press," *Eurasianet* (blog), June 12, 2020, <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-covid-19-outbreak-offers-cover-for-fresh-assault-on-free-press>.
13. "World Report 2021: Rights Trends in Tajikistan."
14. "World Report 2021: Rights Trends in Tajikistan."
15. Catherine Putz, "If Only It Were That Easy: Tajikistan Declares Itself COVID-19 Free," *The Diplomat* (blog), January 27, 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/if-only-it-were-that-easy-tajikistan-declares-itself-covid-19-free/>.
16. Sertan Sanderson, "Press Freedom in Tajikistan: Going from Bad to Worse."
17. "Tajikistan's Excess Mortality Data Belie COVID-19 Denialism," *Eurasianet* (blog), February 23, 2021, <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistans-excess-mortality-data-belie-covid-19-denialism>.

Towards Inclusive Employment For Peace

1. ILO, *Employment for Peace, Stability and Development* https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_176826.pdf
2. Can more jobs bring peace?, *International Alert*, February 2020, <https://www.international-alert.org/publications/can-more-jobs-bring-peace-kenya-somalia>

Young and Resilient: Timor-Leste In The Time Of COVID-19

1. Potter, Evan H. "Niche diplomacy as Canadian foreign policy". *International Journal*, Vol. 52, No. 1. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40203170?seq=1>



THE METHODOLOGY BEHIND THE FRAGILE STATES INDEX

In a highly interconnected world, pressures on one fragile state can have serious repercussions not only for that state and its people, but also for its neighbors and other states halfway across the globe. Since the end of the Cold War, a number of states have erupted into mass violence stemming from internal conflict. Some of these crises emerge from ethnic tensions; some are civil wars; others take on the form of revolutions; and many result in complex humanitarian emergencies.

Fault lines can emerge between identity groups, defined by language, religion, race, ethnicity, nationality, class, caste, clan or area of origin. Tensions can deteriorate into conflict through a variety of circumstances, such as competition over resources, predatory or fractured leadership, corruption, or unresolved group grievances. The reasons for state fragility are complex but not unpredictable. It is critically important that the international community understand and closely monitor the conditions that contribute to fragility — and be prepared to take the necessary actions to deal with the underlying issues or otherwise mitigate the negative effects.

To have meaningful early warning, and effective policy responses, assessments must go beyond specialized area knowledge, narrative case studies and anecdotal evidence to identify and grasp broad social trends. A mixed approach integrating qualitative and quantitative data sources is needed to establish patterns and trends. With the right data and analysis it is possible to identify problems that may be simmering below the surface. Decision makers need access to this kind of information to implement effective policies.

The Fragile States Index (FSI) produced by The Fund for Peace (FFP) is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are outweighing a states' capacity to manage those pressures. By highlighting pertinent vulnerabilities which contribute to the risk of state fragility, the Index — and the social science framework and data

analysis tools upon which it is built — makes political risk assessment and early warning of conflict accessible to policy-makers and the public at large.

The strength of the FSI is its ability to distill millions of pieces of information into a form that is relevant as well as easily digestible and informative. Daily, FFP collects thousands of reports and information from around the world, detailing the existing social, economic and political pressures faced by each of the 178 countries that we analyze.

ORIGINS OF THE FSI: THE CAST FRAMEWORK

The genesis of most indices is to begin with a concept of what needs to be measured, followed by the development of a methodology that hopes to perform that measurement. The FSI followed a very different trajectory, whereby the idea for the Index occurred subsequently to the development of its own methodology.

The FSI traces its origins to the creation of FFP's Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), which was developed in the 1990s as a framework for policymakers and field practitioners to be able to better understand and measure conflict drivers and dynamics in complex environments. The CAST framework has been widely peer reviewed, and the continued usage of the framework by many of those same professionals, as well as now by local civil society and community groups in conflict-affected areas, is testament to the framework's enduring relevance. In 2004, the CAST framework was used as the basis for the FSI, as researchers wished to determine whether state fragility could be assessed and ranked at a national level using the existing framework.

PRACTICAL APPLICATION: THE FSI ANALYTICAL PROCESS

Though at the ground level the CAST framework is applied using various practices such as individual incident reporting and observation by field monitors, the sheer volume of data to be analyzed at an international level required a different approach. To that end, technology was employed to enable researchers to process large volumes of data to perform the national level assessments that feed into the FSI.

Based on CAST's comprehensive social science approach, data from three main streams — pre-existing quantitative data sets, content analysis, and qualitative expert analysis — is triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the Index.

1. **Content Analysis:** Each of the twelve indicators of the CAST framework are broken down into sub-indicators, and for each of these, hundreds of Boolean search phrases are applied to global media data to determine the level of saliency of issues for each of those sub-indicators in each country. The raw data, provided by a commercial content aggregator, includes media articles, research reports, and other qualitative data points collected from over 10,000 different English-language sources around the world. Every year, the number of articles and reports analyzed is between 45-50 million. Based on the assessed saliency for each of the sub-indicators, provisional scores are apportioned for each country.
2. **Quantitative Data:** Pre-existing quantitative data sets, generally from international and multilateral statistical agencies (such as the United Nations, World Bank, and World Health Organization) are identified for their ability to statistically represent key aspects of the indicators. The raw data sets are normalized and scaled for comparative analysis. The trends identified in the quantitative analysis for each country are then compared with the provisional scores from the Content Analysis phase. Depending on the degree to which the Content Analysis


and the Quantitative Data agree, the provisional scores are confirmed, or where they disagree, are reconciled based on a set of rules that dictate allowable movements in score in the event of disagreement between the two data streams.

3. **Qualitative Review:** Separately, a team of social science researchers independently reviews each of the 178 countries, providing assessments based on key events from that year, compared to the previous one. Recognizing that every data set and approach has different strengths and weaknesses, this step helps to ensure that dynamic year-on-year trends across different indicators are picked up — which may not be evident in lagging quantitative data sets that measure longer term structural factors. It also helps to mitigate any potential false positives or negative that may emerge from noisy content analysis data.

These three data streams are then triangulated, applying a set of rules to ensure the data sets are integrated in a way that leverages the strengths of the different approaches. This approach also helps to ensure that inherent weaknesses, gaps, or biases in one source are checked by the others. Though the basic data underpinning of the Index is already freely and widely available electronically, the strength of the analysis is in the methodological rigor and the systematic integration of a wide range of data sources. Final indicator scores for each country are then produced from this process. A panel review is then conducted

by the research team of the final Index to ensure all scores are proportionate across the country spectrum.

The final FSI Index product is intended as an entry point into deeper interpretive analysis for the user. Though an index inherently ranks different countries — making some more fragile than others — ultimately the goal of the FSI is to measure trends in pressures within each individual state. By identifying the most salient pressures within a country, it creates the opportunity for deeper analysis and planning by policy makers and practitioners alike to strengthen each state's resiliency. To that end, the following section outlines what each indicator seeks to measure in the Index — as well as providing guiding questions for deeper levels of analysis and inquiry by the user.





METHODOLOGICAL NOTE:

ON THE 179TH COUNTRY

In keeping with our policy of including United Nations member and observer states over 80,000 person population, this year the FSI joins comparable datasets and indices in scoring Palestine as a discrete entity. This decision was multifaceted and in keeping with several other peer indices, including the Inform Risk Index, Global Peace Index, Economic Value of Peace, Global Terrorism Index and Freedom House. As this is the first year these indicators have been disaggregated, there are several observations of key interest that are now better illuminated. From 2020 forward, FSI scores will be able to better reflect the realities and the patterns of both Israel and Palestine.



UNDERSTANDING THE FRAGILE STATES INDEX

The Fragile States Index (FSI) is an annual ranking of 179 countries based on the different pressures they face that impact their levels of fragility. The Index is based on The Fund for Peace's proprietary Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) analytical approach. Based on comprehensive social science methodology, three primary streams of data — quantitative, qualitative, and expert validation — are triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the FSI. Millions of documents are analyzed every year, and by applying highly specialized search parameters, scores are apportioned for every country based on twelve key political, social and economic indicators and over 100 sub-indicators that are the result of years of expert social science research.

INTERPRETING THE FSI SCORES

The 2021 FSI, the 17th edition of the annual Index, comprises data collected between January 1, 2020 and December 31, 2020 — thus, certain well-publicized events that have occurred since January 1, 2021 are not covered by the 2021 Index. The FSI scores should be interpreted with the understanding that the lower the score, the better. Therefore, a reduced score indicates an improvement and greater relative stability, just as a higher score indicates greater instability. FFP attempts as much as possible to de-emphasize rankings, as it is our firm belief that a country's overall score (and indeed, its indicator scores) are a far more important and accurate barometer of a country's performance, and that as much as countries should be compared against other countries, it is more useful to compare a country against itself, over time. Hence, our analysis focuses more on specific indicator scores or trend lines over time rather than just rankings. Ultimately, the FSI is an entry point into deeper interpretive analysis by civil society, government, businesses and practitioners alike — to understand more about a state's capacities and pressures which contribute to levels of fragility and resilience.

COHESION INDICATORS



Security
Apparatus



Factionalized
Elites



Group
Grievance

ECONOMIC INDICATORS



Economic
Decline



Uneven
Development



Human Flight &
Brain Drain

POLITICAL INDICATORS



State
Legitimacy



Public
Services



Human Rights &
Rule of Law

SOCIAL + CROSS-CUTTING INDICATORS



Demographic
Pressures



Refugees &
IDPs



External
Intervention

THE INDICATORS: COHESION

SECURITY APPARATUS



The Security Apparatus indicator considers the security threats to a state, such as bombings, attacks and battle-related deaths, rebel movements, mutinies, coups, or terrorism. The Security Apparatus indicator also takes into account serious criminal factors, such as organized crime and homicides, and perceived trust of citizens in domestic security. In some instances, the security apparatus may extend beyond traditional military or police forces to include state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected “enemies,” or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition. In other instances, the security apparatus of a state can include a “deep state”, that may consist of secret intelligence units, or other irregular security forces, that serve the interests of a political leader or clique. As a counter example, the indicator will also take into account armed resistance to a governing authority, particularly the manifestation of violent uprisings and insurgencies, proliferation of independent militias, vigilantes, or mercenary groups that challenge the state’s monopoly on the use of force.

Questions to consider may include:*

Monopoly on the Use of Force

- Is the military under civilian control?
- Do private militias exist against the state?
- Is there paramilitary activity?
- Do private armies exist to protect assets?
- Are there guerilla forces operating in the state? Do they control territory?

Relationship Between Security and Citizenry

- Are the police considered to be professional?
- Is violence often state-sponsored and politically motivated?
- Is the government dealing well with any insurgency or security situation?

Force

- Does the military and police maintain proper use of force?
- Are there accusations of police brutality?

Arms

- Is there a high availability of weapons?
- If in reconstruction, is there an adequate plan for demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants?

FACTIONALIZED ELITES



The Factionalized Elites indicator considers the fragmentation of state institutions along ethnic, class, clan, racial or religious lines, as well as brinkmanship and gridlock between ruling elites. It also factors in the use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of nationalism, xenophobia, communal irredentism (e.g., a “greater Serbia”) or of communal solidarity (e.g., “ethnic cleansing” or “defending the faith”). In extreme cases, it can be representative of the absence of legitimate leadership widely accepted as representing the entire citizenry. The Factionalized Elites indicator measures power struggles, political competition, political transitions and, where elections occur, will factor in the credibility of electoral processes (or in their absence, the perceived legitimacy of the ruling class).

** Indicator descriptions are not exhaustive, and are intended only as an entry point for further interpretive analysis by the user.*

GROUP GRIEVANCE

Questions to consider may include*:

Representative Leadership

- Is leadership fairly elected? Is leadership representative of the population?
- Are there factionalized elites, tribal elites and/or fringe groups? How powerful are they?
- Is there a political reconciliation process?
- Is the military representative of the population?

Identity

- Is there a sense of national identity? Are there strong feelings of nationalism? Or are there calls for separatism?
- Does hate speech via radio and media exist?
- Is religious, ethnic, or other stereotyping prevalent and is there scape-goating?
- Does cross-cultural respect exist?

Resource Distribution

- Is wealth concentrated in hands of a few?
- Is there a burgeoning middle class?
- Does any one group control the majority of resources?
- Are resources fairly distributed? Does the government adequately distribute wealth through taxes?

Equality and Equity

- Are the laws democratic or reasonable?
- Is the system representative of the population?



The Group Grievance indicator focuses on divisions and schisms between different groups in society – particularly divisions based on social or political characteristics – and their role in access to services or resources, and inclusion in the political process. Group Grievance may also have a historical component, where aggrieved communal groups cite injustices of the past, sometimes going back centuries, that influence and shape that group's role in society and relationships with other groups. This history may in turn be shaped by patterns of real or perceived atrocities or “crimes” committed with apparent impunity against communal groups. Groups may also feel aggrieved because they are denied autonomy, self-determination or political independence to which they believe they are entitled. The indicator also considers where specific groups are singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or repression, or where there is public scapegoating of groups believed to have acquired wealth, status or power “illegitimately,” which may manifest itself in the emergence of fiery rhetoric, such as through “hate” radio, pamphleteering, and stereotypical or nationalistic political speech.

Questions to consider may include*:

Post-Conflict Response

- Does a Truth & Reconciliation process exist or is one needed?
- Have groups been reintegrated?
- Is there a plan for reconstruction and development?
- Are victims of past atrocities compensated (or is there a plan to)?
- Are war criminals apprehended and prosecuted?
- Has amnesty been granted?

Equality

- Is there an equitable and efficient distribution of resources?

Divisions

- Are there feelings/reports of ethnic and/or religious intolerance and/or violence?
- Are groups oppressed or do they feel oppressed?
- Is there history of violence against a group or group grievance?
- How are intertribal and/or interethnic relations?
- Is there freedom of religion according to laws and practiced by society? Are there reports of religiously motivated violence?

Communal Violence

- Is vigilante justice reported?
- Are there reports of mass violence and/or killings?

THE INDICATORS: ECONOMIC

ECONOMIC DECLINE



Economic Decline indicator considers factors related to economic decline within a country. For example, the indicator looks at patterns of progressive economic decline of the society as a whole as measured by per capita income, Gross National Product, unemployment rates, inflation, productivity, debt, poverty levels, or business failures. It also takes into account sudden drops in commodity prices, trade revenue, or foreign investment, and any collapse or devaluation of the national currency. The Economic Decline indicator further considers the responses to economic conditions and their consequences, such as extreme social hardship imposed by economic austerity programs, or perceived increasing group inequalities. The Economic Decline indicator is focused on the formal economy as well as illicit trade, including the drug and human trafficking, and capital flight, or levels of corruption and illicit transactions such as money laundering or embezzlement.

Questions to consider may include:*

Public Finances

- What level is the government debt?

Economic Conditions

- How are the interest rates – actual and projected?
- How is the inflation rate – actual and projected?
- What is the level of productivity?
- What is the GDP – actual and projected?
- How is the unemployment – current and rate of unemployment?

Economic Climate

- Consumer Confidence: How do people view the economy?
- How do experts view the economy?
- Is the business climate attractive to Foreign Direct Investment?
- Do the laws and access to capital allow for internal entrepreneurship?

Economic Diversification

- Economic Focus: Does one product make up the majority of the economy?

UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT



The Uneven Economic Development indicator considers inequality within the economy, irrespective of the actual performance of an economy. For example, the Indicator looks at structural inequality that is based on group (such as racial, ethnic, religious, or other identity group) or based on education, economic status, or region (such as urban-rural divide). The Indicator considers not only actual inequality, but also perceptions of inequality, recognizing that perceptions of economic inequality can fuel grievance as much as real inequality, and can reinforce communal tensions or nationalistic rhetoric. Further to measuring economic inequality, the Indicator also takes into account the opportunities for groups to improve their economic status, such as through access to employment, education, or job training such that, even if there is economic inequality present, to what degree it is structural and reinforcing?

** Indicator descriptions are not exhaustive, and are intended only as an entry point for further interpretive analysis by the user.*

HUMAN FLIGHT AND BRAIN DRAIN

Questions to consider may include*:

Economic Equality

- Economic Equality: Is there a large economic gap?
- Is the economic system discriminatory?
- Does economic justice exist?
- Are hiring practices generally fair – legally and perceived?
- Do equal rights exist in the society?
- Are there laws protecting equal rights?

Economic Opportunity

- Does free education exist and if so, to which grade?
- Is the education provided relatively equal?
- Fair Housing: Is there a housing system for the poor?
- Do programs for job training exist?
- Do people know about the job training and is it available based on qualification and need?

Socio-Economic Dynamics

- Do ghettos and slums exist?



The Human Flight and Brain Drain Indicator considers the economic impact of human displacement (for economic or political reasons) and the consequences this may have on a country's development. On the one hand, this may involve the voluntary emigration of the middle class – particularly economically productive segments of the population, such as entrepreneurs, or skilled workers such as physicians – due to economic deterioration in their home country and the hope of better opportunities farther afield. On the other hand, it may involve the forced displacement of professionals or intellectuals who are fleeing their country due to actual or feared persecution or repression. The indicator specifically measures the economic impact that displacement may wreak on an economy through the loss of productive, skilled professional labor.

Questions to consider may include*:

Retention of Technical and Intellectual Capital

- Are professionals leaving the country?
- Are politicians or political elites leaving the country?
- Is there a relatively high proportion of higher educated people leaving the country?
- Is the middle class beginning to return to the country?

Economics

- Are there a large amount of remittances coming to families from relatives overseas?

Diaspora

- Is there growth of a country's exiled communities or diasporas abroad?
- Does the diaspora have an impact on the home state economy, or on politics in the home state?

THE INDICATORS: POLITICAL

STATE LEGITIMACY



The State Legitimacy Indicator considers the representativeness and openness of government and its relationship with its citizenry. The Indicator looks at the population's level of confidence in state institutions and processes, and assesses the effects where that confidence is absent, manifested through mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, or the rise of armed insurgencies. Though the State Legitimacy indicator does not necessarily make a judgment on democratic governance, it does consider the integrity of elections where they take place (such as flawed or boycotted elections), the nature of political transitions and, where there is an absence of democratic elections, the degree to which the government is representative of the population which it governs. The Indicator takes into account openness of government, specifically the openness of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation, or conversely the levels of corruption, profiteering, and marginalizing, persecuting, or otherwise excluding opposition groups. The Indicator also considers the ability of a state to exercise basic functions that infer a population's confidence in its government and institutions, such as through the ability to collect taxes.

Questions to consider may include:*

Confidence in the Political Process

- Does the government have the confidence of the people?

Political Opposition

- Have demonstrations occurred?
- Have riots or uprisings occurred?

Transparency

- Is there evidence of corruption on the part of government officials?
- Are national and/or local officials considered to be corrupt?

Openness and Fairness of the Political Process

- Do all parties enjoy political rights?
- Is the government representative of the population?
- Have there been recent peaceful transitions of power?
- What is the longer term history of power transitions?
- Are elections perceived free and fair?
- Have elections been monitored and reported as free and fair?

Political Violence

- Are there reports of politically motivated attacks, assassinations?
- Are there reports of armed insurgents and attacks?
- Have there been terrorist attacks and how likely are they?

PUBLIC SERVICES



The Public Services Indicator refers to the presence of basic state functions that serve the people. On the one hand, this may include the provision of essential services, such as health, education, water and sanitation, transport infrastructure, electricity and power, and internet and connectivity. On the other hand, it may include the state's ability to protect its citizens, such as from terrorism and violence, through perceived effective policing. Further, even where basic state functions and services are provided, the Indicator further considers to whom – whether the state narrowly serves the ruling elites, such as security agencies, presidential staff, the central bank, or the diplomatic service, while failing to provide comparable levels of service to the general populace – such as rural versus urban populations. The Indicator also considers the level and maintenance of general infrastructure to the extent that its absence would negatively affect the country's actual or potential development.

** Indicator descriptions are not exhaustive, and are intended only as an entry point for further interpretive analysis by the user.*

HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW

Questions to consider may include*:

General Provision of Public Services

- Is there equal access to public services?
- What are the general conditions of public services?

Health

- Is there adequate access to medicines?
- Are there an adequate number of medical facilities for all people?
- Are there an adequate number of medical professionals for the population?
- What is the infant mortality rate – actual and projected?
- Is there access to an adequate potable water supply?
- Is sanitation system adequate?

Education

- What is the level of school enrollment? Is it different by gender?
- What are the literacy rates? Is it different by gender?

Shelter

- Do the poor have access to housing?
- Are housing costs in line with economy?

Infrastructure

- Are roads adequate and safe?
- Are there adequate airports for sustainable development?
- Are there adequate railroads for sustainable development?
- Is there an adequate supply of fuel?



The Human Rights and Rule of Law Indicator considers the relationship between the state and its population insofar as fundamental human rights are protected and freedoms are observed and respected. The Indicator looks at whether there is widespread abuse of legal, political and social rights, including those of individuals, groups and institutions (e.g. harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political

ends, repression of political opponents). The Indicator also considers outbreaks of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence perpetrated against civilians. It also looks at factors such as denial of due process consistent with international norms and practices for political prisoners or dissidents, and whether there is current or emerging authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated.

Questions to consider may include*:

Civil and Political Rights and Freedoms

- Do communal, labor, political, and/or minority rights exist and are they protected?
- Are there civil rights laws and are civil rights protected?
- Is the right to life protected for all?
- Is freedom of speech protected?
- Is there freedom of movement?
- Does religious freedom exist?

Violation of Rights

- Is there a history of systemic violation of rights by the government or others?
- Are there reports of state- or group-sponsored torture?
- Are there labor laws or reports of forced labor or child labor?
- Are groups forced to relocate? Is there proper compensation?

Openness

- Does independent media exist?
- Do reporters feel free to publish accusations against those in power?
- Is there equal access to information?

Justice

- If rights aren't protected, is there a legal system in which they can be addressed?
- Do accused receive a fair and timely trial? Is this equal for all?
- Are there accusations or reports of arbitrary arrests? Are these state-sponsored?
- Are there accusations or reports of illegal detention?
- How are the prison conditions?

Equality

- Is there a process and system that encourages political power sharing?

THE INDICATORS: SOCIAL AND CROSS-CUTTING

DEMOGRAPHIC PRESSURES



The Demographic Pressures Indicator considers pressures upon the state deriving from the population itself or the environment around it. For example, the Indicator measures population pressures related to food supply, access to safe water, and other life-sustaining resources, or health, such as prevalence of disease and epidemics. The Indicator considers demographic characteristics, such as pressures from high population growth

rates or skewed population distributions, such as a “youth or age bulge,” or sharply divergent rates of population growth among competing communal groups, recognizing that such effects can have profound social, economic, and political effects. Beyond the population, the Indicator also takes into account pressures stemming from natural disasters (hurricanes, earthquakes, floods or drought), and pressures upon the population from environmental hazards.

Questions to consider may include:*

Population

- Is the population growth rate sustainable? Is the current and projected distribution reasonable?
- Is population density putting pressure on areas of the state?
- What is the infant mortality rate – actual and projected?
- Is there a high orphan population?

Public Health

- Is there a system for controlling spreading of diseases, pandemics?
- Is there a high likelihood or existence of diseases or epidemics?

Food and Nutrition

- Is the food supply adequate to deal with potential interruption?
- Is there a likelihood of droughts?

- Is there a short-term food shortage or longer-term starvation?
- Are there long-term food shortages affecting health?

Environment

- Do sound environmental policies exist and are current practices sustainable?
- Is natural disaster likely, recurring?
- If a natural disaster occurs, is there an adequate response plan?
- Has deforestation taken place or are there laws to protect forests?

Resources

- Does resource competition exist?
- Does land competition exist and are there laws to arbitrate disputes?
- Is there access to an adequate potable water supply?

REFUGEES AND IDPS



The Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons Indicator measures the pressure upon states caused by the forced displacement of large communities as a result of social, political, environmental or other causes, measuring displacement within countries, as well as refugee flows into others. The indicator measures refugees by country of asylum, recognizing that population inflows can put additional pressure on public services, and can sometimes create broader humanitarian and security challenges for the receiving state if that state does not have the absorption capacity and adequate resources. The Indicator also measures the internally displaced persons (IDP) and refugees by country of origin, which signifies internal state pressures as a result of violence, environmental or other factors such as health epidemics. These measures are considered within the context of the state's population (per capita) and human development trajectory, and over time (year on year spikes), recognizing that some IDPs or refugees, may have been displaced for long periods of time.

** Indicator descriptions are not exhaustive, and are intended only as an entry point for further interpretive analysis by the user.*

EXTERNAL INTERVENTION

Questions to consider may include:*

Refugees

- Are refugees likely to come from neighboring countries?
- Are there resources to provide for projected and actual refugees?
- Are there sufficient refugee camps or are refugees integrated into communities?
- Are there reports of violence against refugees?
- Are conditions safe in refugee camps?

Internally Displaced Persons

- How many IDPs are there in relation to population?
- Are IDPs likely to increase in the near future?
- Are there resources to provide for projected and actual IDPs?

Response to Displacement

- Is there access to additional resources from international community for refugees and/or IDPs?
- Are there plans for relocation and settlement of current IDPs and/or refugees?



The External Intervention Indicator considers the influence and impact of external actors in the functioning – particularly security and economic – of a state. On the one hand, External Intervention focuses on security aspects of engagement from external actors, both covert and overt, in the internal affairs of a state by governments, armies, intelligence services, identity groups, or other entities that may affect the balance of power (or resolution of a conflict) within a state. On the other hand, External Intervention also focuses on economic engagement by outside actors, including multilateral organizations, through large-scale loans, development projects, or foreign aid, such as ongoing budget support, control of finances, or management of the state's economic policy, creating economic dependency. External Intervention also takes into account humanitarian intervention, such as the deployment of an international peacekeeping mission.

Questions to consider may include:*

Political Intervention

- Is there external support for factions opposed to the government?

Force Intervention

- Are foreign troops present?
- Are military attacks from other countries occurring?
- Is there external military assistance?
- Are there military training exercises with other nations or support of military training from other states?
- Is there a peacekeeping operation on the ground?
- Is there external support for police training?
- Are covert operations taking place?

Economic Intervention

- Is the country receiving economic intervention or aid?
- Is the country dependent on economic aid?

FUND FOR PEACE FRAGILE STATES INDEX 2020

													Total	Change from Previous Year
Afghanistan	100	86	72	92	81	70	87	98	74	90	88	83	102.1	-0.8
Albania	48	62	41	64	29	83	55	44	36	41	26	61	590	0.2
Algeria	60	75	72	68	56	55	78	56	63	48	68	37	736	-1.0
Angola	72	72	81	84	89	60	82	93	62	90	59	46	890	1.7
Antigua and Barbuda	54	37	38	69	45	60	42	44	39	43	25	55	549	2.8
Argentina	49	28	38	71	49	30	40	48	33	53	1.9	43	501	4.1
Armenia	57	70	53	66	36	68	69	39	60	44	66	70	698	5.6
Australia	27	17	31	16	18	05	05	28	17	29	20	05	218	1.7
Austria	16	32	39	18	23	16	06	23	05	34	44	05	261	1.9
Azerbaijan	64	79	61	47	51	43	91	55	77	42	69	72	751	3.8
Bahamas	49	45	29	51	45	44	24	57	46	71	26	37	524	2.4
Bahrain	59	76	96	41	53	30	80	35	86	41	17	53	667	2.8
Bangladesh	70	93	86	55	57	70	74	77	72	71	73	52	850	-0.7
Barbados	44	42	29	63	46	53	14	38	31	43	13	54	470	0.5
Belarus	56	88	59	51	37	41	90	33	79	51	24	71	680	2.1
Belgium	26	44	41	46	21	25	08	25	06	40	23	05	310	3.9
Belize	74	43	47	77	42	57	40	60	54	50	31	67	642	3.3
Benin	53	67	26	67	82	65	51	85	49	77	51	55	728	0.3
Bhutan	33	75	91	50	47	61	31	62	52	52	58	71	683	-1.2
Bolivia	59	85	56	59	82	62	70	69	59	71	31	46	749	-0.1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	50	87	66	64	41	65	62	48	49	51	70	76	729	2.8
Boswana	34	33	39	66	68	49	24	71	48	76	33	29	570	-0.1
Brazil	68	65	77	64	70	39	70	74	74	88	33	36	758	2.8
Brunei Darussalam	42	74	65	33	73	38	71	26	69	28	11	33	563	-0.4
Bulgaria	43	53	42	52	38	50	37	40	29	52	37	43	516	2.4
Burkina Faso	90	78	45	70	78	70	59	87	55	86	72	81	871	1.2
Burundi	80	82	73	88	72	56	93	79	92	92	82	82	971	-0.7
Cabo Verde	48	55	29	65	55	77	41	56	28	68	36	84	642	-0.6
Cambodia	64	83	61	52	62	66	87	82	77	59	45	68	806	0.2
Cameroon	83	93	87	70	76	71	90	86	75	88	83	70	972	-0.7
Canada	28	25	22	20	23	11	05	23	13	20	22	05	217	2.6
Central African Republic	80	97	81	85	96	66	90	100	93	89	97	96	1070	-0.5
Chad	89	95	80	86	87	79	94	98	82	96	93	79	1058	-0.7
Chile	38	22	32	42	51	34	52	45	36	59	19	11	441	1.7
China	55	72	71	37	59	38	85	53	96	59	37	27	689	-1.0
Colombia	69	76	75	60	64	50	55	66	68	80	76	54	793	2.7
Comoros	62	80	42	76	73	68	77	81	58	80	60	68	825	1.2
Congo Democratic Repub-	86	95	94	85	85	68	92	98	92	98	100	91	1084	-1.0
Congo Republic	70	67	84	90	81	68	91	89	78	80	65	61	924	0.3
Costa Rica	35	38	30	52	47	35	13	47	11	35	39	43	425	2.3
Cote d'Ivoire	72	96	73	66	77	64	77	84	71	83	66	78	907	1.1
Croatia	26	44	49	57	28	57	23	31	26	46	66	45	498	3.7
Cuba	40	70	28	48	42	55	74	43	65	50	30	50	595	0.3
Cyprus	35	79	51	56	49	35	40	33	27	34	53	82	574	1.4
Czechia	26	53	46	42	20	35	41	27	20	30	32	21	393	3.5

													Total	Change from Previous Year
Denmark	17	14	37	17	12	13	05	14	09	23	22	05	188	1.2
Djibouti	53	73	53	68	73	46	84	74	72	75	71	82	824	-0.3
Dominican Republic	61	62	46	51	49	66	60	70	47	67	26	42	647	0.3
Ecuador	59	82	61	63	60	46	57	66	42	69	56	51	712	1.8
Egypt	76	91	83	73	51	52	86	47	98	65	61	67	850	-1.0
El Salvador	66	48	55	61	54	84	44	68	55	70	55	56	716	2.6
Equatorial Guinea	59	82	69	63	79	43	98	87	84	85	50	42	841	1.1
Eritrea	62	84	83	77	83	86	96	83	89	82	74	71	970	1.2
Estonia	23	59	74	32	26	43	15	25	13	29	19	37	395	0.9
Eswatini	51	68	22	98	80	64	86	77	82	89	41	67	825	-0.5
Ethiopia	84	92	95	59	67	66	88	89	84	94	91	81	990	4.4
Fiji	65	79	57	77	51	76	57	44	57	41	28	72	704	0.5
Finland	25	14	06	29	10	15	05	16	05	17	15	05	162	1.2
France	35	19	64	42	30	21	09	18	12	39	27	09	325	2.0
Gabon	48	80	26	59	57	52	75	65	67	67	33	45	674	-1.6
Gambia	57	77	26	82	59	73	72	76	78	84	60	61	805	-1.7
Georgia	56	91	73	57	44	55	82	44	48	45	63	68	726	1.5
Germany	23	23	40	18	25	20	05	20	08	21	40	05	248	1.3
Ghana	46	54	32	55	64	72	32	74	44	69	40	57	639	-0.2
Greece	39	41	42	60	29	39	55	40	33	39	59	69	545	2.4
Grenada	48	56	36	63	49	75	43	44	21	39	22	65	561	0.8
Guatemala	68	71	94	50	71	71	65	72	72	72	48	40	794	0.2
Guinea	80	99	93	82	73	65	100	95	69	86	70	62	974	0.2
Guinea Bissau	77	96	43	76	93	69	89	90	66	86	61	74	920	-0.8
Guyana	71	51	65	45	47	82	46	64	33	58	34	65	661	0.2
Haiti	66	96	53	89	92	81	88	96	71	82	71	90	975	-0.3
Honduras	70	70	50	64	69	67	71	76	72	61	55	69	794	2.7
Hungary	24	53	36	50	29	40	64	34	53	33	56	39	511	3.4
Iceland	07	18	05	34	13	19	05	12	05	15	15	32	180	0.1
India	66	73	82	70	62	55	43	75	77	81	41	45	770	1.7
Indonesia	58	71	71	43	48	63	44	61	64	68	42	43	676	-0.2
Iran	69	96	93	76	49	53	92	47	95	55	53	67	845	1.1
Iraq	79	96	82	69	61	65	88	89	81	84	83	85	962	0.3
Ireland	27	15	05	27	16	28	05	25	16	28	14	16	222	2.1
Israel	24	79	67	12	36	24	33	18	29	48	12	48	430	0.0
Italy	51	49	43	57	23	24	28	37	09	52	45	34	452	2.9
Japanica	66	37	22	69	47	90	36	72	52	46	28	47	612	1.2
Jordan	18	26	25	37	19	29	05	18	30	57	32	26	322	-0.1
Kazakhstan	52	69	86	69	48	51	63	50	68	61	86	65	768	1.4
Kenya	40	76	80	55	32	42	82	46	67	41	21	30	612	1.4
Kuwait	74	86	80	64	74	66	76	82	63	83	75	69	892	-1.1
Kyrgyz Republic	30	75	41	30	42	30	70	33	72	46	24	36	529	2.0
Laos	62	83	81	71	49	67	80	53	63	55	41	59	764	2.5
Lavnia	44	83	72	51	53	68	90	66	69	64	51	49	760	-0.8
	26	43	83	37	35	55	22	39	24	30	19	27	440	1.6

FUND FOR PEACE FRAGILE STATES INDEX 2020

													Total	Change from Previous Year
Lebanon	75	96	79	90	54	62	77	58	70	52	88	89	890	43
Lesotho	64	73	27	88	82	75	47	75	51	84	43	70	779	-04
Liberia	66	86	46	85	72	69	68	95	67	85	75	81	895	-05
Libya	96	94	75	96	56	54	99	74	91	59	77	99	970	18
Lithuania	28	30	33	37	41	52	15	37	22	34	18	40	387	23
Luxembourg	07	34	21	26	14	16	05	19	11	28	25	05	211	20
Madagascar	63	78	33	73	90	61	63	87	58	92	41	56	795	-01
Malawi	48	84	47	77	80	68	71	82	53	94	54	74	832	-08
Malaysia	54	68	54	33	41	45	63	43	68	44	30	26	569	-07
Maldives	55	81	40	65	28	56	75	54	75	54	37	56	676	14
Mali	96	62	81	75	72	79	75	91	74	87	81	93	966	06
Malta	24	20	27	40	20	37	31	24	33	37	38	31	362	27
Mauritania	63	88	73	71	64	65	79	87	69	85	79	68	891	03
Mauritius	12	32	44	54	27	42	21	32	36	29	17	35	381	09
Mexico	85	54	63	50	53	49	55	69	58	67	50	46	699	26
Micronesia	37	56	37	85	71	90	43	67	35	60	36	100	717	04
Moldova	51	83	64	59	38	75	57	52	45	54	30	62	670	10
Mongolia	29	55	26	51	52	42	38	52	40	47	25	66	523	03
Montenegro	46	65	91	60	20	47	36	44	34	39	34	69	585	30
Morocco	49	66	85	62	50	75	68	51	56	48	53	52	715	03
Mozambique	73	66	58	83	92	73	70	99	74	98	77	76	939	22
Myanmar	89	83	99	48	71	65	81	89	91	63	88	71	938	-02
Namibia	48	35	46	74	74	62	30	74	26	81	41	52	643	-08
Nepal	53	88	94	53	58	62	64	73	65	81	72	59	822	-03
Netherlands	22	34	36	22	16	24	05	13	07	31	26	05	241	10
New Zealand	14	14	26	34	21	16	05	14	05	14	16	05	184	02
Nicaragua	58	71	59	60	70	77	86	64	73	48	37	68	771	00
Niger	89	93	75	68	78	70	71	97	71	88	85	75	960	07
Nigeria	88	96	88	86	77	65	84	93	87	93	66	57	980	08
North Korea	80	88	52	89	73	38	99	86	94	71	38	92	900	-03
North Macedonia	47	73	60	65	45	60	51	48	30	42	69	55	645	24
Norway	18	11	33	19	10	08	05	16	05	14	22	05	166	-01
Oman	30	66	23	50	41	19	69	37	70	45	19	35	504	24
Pakistan	79	90	88	71	53	62	73	80	73	79	75	82	905	-16
Palestine	60	89	50	70	49	88	88	42	77	85	62	100	860	00
Panama	52	22	56	37	62	40	31	54	38	53	22	20	487	28
Papua New Guinea	67	71	51	70	88	65	60	93	69	76	43	56	809	-14
Paraguay	63	78	46	49	71	50	66	63	55	55	30	38	664	13
Peru	61	74	86	48	64	62	72	74	35	74	41	23	714	37
Philippines	93	80	73	53	52	54	74	68	78	76	63	60	824	14
Poland	24	42	56	38	24	46	43	30	40	36	24	28	431	21
Portugal	05	25	13	48	20	28	08	29	11	33	18	30	268	32
Qatar	14	50	34	16	47	15	64	29	61	34	14	63	441	03
Romania	21	57	60	45	38	54	50	48	36	43	21	37	510	43
Russia	77	84	80	52	52	34	85	43	89	46	46	48	736	10

													Total	Change from Previous Year
Rwanda	58	80	96	58	77	65	68	75	60	75	75	63	850	-11
Samoa	38	51	45	65	37	99	43	48	36	52	29	99	642	09
Sao Tome and Principe	47	63	42	89	62	79	44	64	30	67	49	79	715	12
Saudi Arabia	57	85	90	43	47	33	78	44	86	49	38	47	697	09
Senegal	51	70	52	73	67	75	36	75	48	71	61	55	734	-12
Serbia	45	83	71	61	43	59	55	39	35	39	74	70	674	13
Seychelles	54	60	41	51	61	53	43	28	42	42	21	67	563	17
Sierra Leone	38	78	56	85	79	74	57	88	50	88	74	67	834	-09
Singapore	07	40	22	16	30	19	37	15	45	21	07	07	266	03
Slovak Republic	12	47	57	43	26	41	38	32	23	24	26	21	390	08
Slovenia	05	20	36	34	24	36	19	24	11	34	28	11	282	23
Solomon Islands	56	82	53	72	80	63	56	79	40	74	44	94	793	-04
Somalia	93	100	83	92	95	88	92	98	87	100	92	89	1109	00
South Africa	64	63	59	83	67	49	59	69	42	71	42	32	700	-01
South Korea	21	39	23	19	22	35	30	22	31	23	16	44	325	04
South Sudan	97	92	88	92	89	67	95	100	87	95	99	93	1094	-14
Spain	34	69	67	53	29	12	69	29	12	35	22	17	448	44
Sri Lanka	68	91	86	56	59	67	63	47	82	57	72	57	805	-13
Sudan	81	91	95	91	83	77	88	88	86	91	94	87	1052	04
Suriname	40	58	64	78	53	56	38	52	42	53	31	50	615	14
Sweden	27	18	17	19	17	07	05	14	09	33	43	05	214	27
Switzerland	16	10	27	20	18	11	05	16	08	32	31	05	199	24
Syria	96	99	97	96	71	82	100	96	97	76	97	100	1107	00
Tajikistan	57	84	67	63	43	56	92	49	85	70	36	49	751	-04
Tanzania	52	62	49	58	70	70	75	88	62	86	55	66	793	11
Thailand	82	97	73	39	45	41	77	40	79	59	51	26	709	01
Timor-Leste	62	83	53	77	62	70	55	76	42	89	54	86	809	-18
Togo	64	76	60	72	83	69	82	85	67	75	63	55	851	-08
Trinidad and Tobago	69	56	30	44	45	72	33	45	37	39	25	34	529	09
Tunisia	71	75	71	78	45	58	59	50	55	43	35	52	692	11
Turkey	72	88	97	53	47	41	73	54	80	51	84	57	797	05
Turkmenistan	51	78	56	49	60	45	98	47	86	54	29	29	682	-09
Uganda	69	89	78	62	70	67	84	80	74	92	91	73	929	02
Ukraine	67	80	57	68	32	58	68	45	60	43	42	78	698	08
United Arab Emirates	25	36	28	24	33	22	64	29	70	36	18	18	403	22
United Kingdom	35	58	61	52	35	25	32	26	21	36	17	17	415	32
United States	43	73	65	21	37	18	35	27	44	50	23	10	446	63
Uruguay	42	27	24	44	33	36	05	38	30	34	19	27	359	23
Uzbekistan	62	88	60	54	57	52	93	46	76	48	44	40	720	-11
Venezuela	73	93	70	98	67	65	95	89	91	65	63	57	926	13
Vietnam	39	69	52	39	38	53	84	43	78	50	45	43	633	-06
Yemen	94	100	94	98	77	67	99	98	97	98	98	97	1117	-08
Zambia	45	59	53	88	93	69	75	80	70	94	55	68	849	05
Zimbabwe	86	100	61	94	77	71	88	90	80	93	82	69	991	-01



www.fundforpeace.org